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I
INTRODUCTION

Starting in the mid-1960's, the national governments in both the United
States and Australia significantly increased their level of involvement in elementary and secondary education, despite the fact that in both systems there
is no direct constitutional responsibility for education at the federal level.
Among the primary concerns of both governments has been the enhancement
of equal educational opportunity for children with special needs. Initiatives in
this area have created tensions and strains in the federal systems of both
nations. State education authorities (and, in the United States, local authorities as well) resent federal intrusion upon what has traditionally been their
prerogative and seek more flexible guidelines and more state autonomy. On
the other hand, interest groups representing special pupil populations (such
as the poor, minorities, linguistic minorities, and the handicapped) press for
tighter federal guidelines to ensure that federal funds are spent for the purposes specified and to ensure that those who have been excluded by educational institutions or given less than an equal opportunity are adequately
protected.
There are many similarities between the United States and Australia that
make such a comparison between the two countries useful.' They are both
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1. When an occasion arose to explore the federal role in education in Australia and its constitutional underpinnings, it seemed to be an ideal opportunity to get some comparative perspective on
the federal approach to providing equal educational opportunity for special pupil populations. I was
invited to be a Visiting Fellow at the University of Western Australia, in Perth, in the summer of
1983. The all-too-brief time spent there gave me, at best, merely a superficial impression of the role
that the Commonwealth government plays in education and issues of federalism in Australia. I met
with officials from the Commonwealth Schools Commission, the Commonwealth Department of Education, State Education Departments of Western Australia (Perth) and New South Wales (Sydney),
the Department of Education of the Australian Capital Territory (ACT), the Catholic Education
Commission of New South Wales, and the Goldfield Region District of Western Australia. I also met

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 48: No. 2

modern, industrialized nations which developed from former British colonies. 2 Their language, laws, systems of government, political, economic, and
social customs and traditions reflect their predominantly English origins.
The governmental systems of the two countries have much in common.
They are both federations with written constitutions 3 and judicial review. 4
Both countries, prior to unification by federation, consisted of collections of
self-governing Crown colonies. Each colony was independent of the others,
sometimes very much sO. 5 Both countries adopted a political system that
with Justice Lionel Murphy of the High Court of Australia, several federal judges, a number of lawyers, and members of the education and law faculties at several universities; I visited several elementary and secondary schools and teachers. I am extremely grateful to all those who gave so generously
of their time to try to enlighten me. The errors and misunderstandings that undoubtedly have crept
into this article are my own-surely due, in part, to the sensory overload I experienced in the six
short weeks I was in Australia.
Although I understand that some legislative or other changes in programs may have occurred
during the past year, this article, written in Spring 1984, is based on information obtained during the
summer of 1983.
2. Australia may owe its existence to the United States. The establishment on the island continent of New South Wales as an English colony was precipitated by the successful struggle of the
thirteen American colonies for independence, since Great Britain needed an alternative location to
which to transport convicts.
3. A comparison of the language of the Australian and U.S. constitutions reveals striking similarities. Indeed, the U.S. Constitution was the model for the Australian Constitution, although the most
obvious model for the federal union of a contiguous group of British colonies would seem to have
been the Canadian Constitution. The Australians were concerned, however, with the dominant position assigned in the Canadian Constitution to the central government (in particular, the power of the
federal government in Canada to veto provincial legislation). See J. LA NAUZE, THE MAKING OF THE
AUSTRALIAN CONSTITuTION 16-17 (1972).
At a conference on federation, held in Melbourne in 1891, a draft constitution was introduced,
drawing heavily on the U.S. Constitution. However, it was "put by" (tabled) for six years. Id. at 87.
When the Constitutional Convention reassembled in Adelaide in 1897, various committees of the
Convention worked from the chapters of the 1891 draft. Id. at 123. The original 1891 draft had
provided for the possibility of a system of "inferior" federal courts like that of the United States.
These courts, together with the Supreme Court, would exercise the whole of federal jurisdiction.
The committee, however, modified the 1891 draft to provide for the possibility of investing state
courts with federal jurisdiction. Id. at 130-31.
The drafters also relied on American legal precedents. For example, as has been noted with
regard to commerce:
[I]t was abundantly clear from American precedents that the general federal power to regulate
trade and commerce with other countries and among the States amply covered the use of navigable rivers as highways for commerce. There was no need to name specific rivers, and indeed
to do so would inevitably invite restrictive interpretation of the power.
Id. at 210.
Even more striking than the parallels in language are the parallels in structure. In the Australian
document, as in that of the United States, many national powers are specifically listed. Compare
AUSTL. CONST. § 51 with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Residual powers remain with the states. Compare
AUSTL. CONST. §§ 106-108 with U.S. CONST. amend. X. Although a few powers are exclusive grants
to the Commonwealth, most are concurrent. The Australian supremacy clause provides that when
State and Commonwealth laws conflict, those of the Commonwealth prevail. Compare AUSTL. CONST.
§ 109 with U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
However, the Australian Constitution contains no guarantees of individual liberties and rights
comparable to those enshrined in the Bill of Rights and the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See infra text accompanying note 32.
4. "[I]n our system the principle of Marbury v. Madison is accepted as axiomatic." Australian
Communist Party v. Commonwealth (The Communist Party Case), 83 C.L.R. 1, 262 (Austi. 1951)

(Fullager, J.).
5. In Australia, the colonial legislatures were considerably more independent in domestic matters than were the American colonies.
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would preserve most of the advantages and powers that had been enjoyed by
the colony-states as separate entities, yet would also result in a unified
nation. 6 Within this federal structure, powers and responsibilities are divided
between central (or federal) and state governments. 7 Jurisdictional disputes
and conflicts about authority are commonplace in both countries.
The two countries have many demographic similarities. Both are essentially urban, industrialized societies8 with densely populated cities and suburbs. Despite the concentration of population in the urban areas, however,
both countries have recent rural origins and still have strong rural interests
that play a more powerful role in economic, political and social life than the
size of the rural populations appears to warrant. Moreover, because the countries are large and contain within their borders a number of different geographical regions, there are in both countries wide divergences in population
density and cultural characteristics that may have substantial influence on
educational policy.
The ethnic backgrounds of the two countries also are similar. In both the
United States and Australia, there were indigenous people whose cultures and
social structure fell victim to white settlers' prejudice and ignorance. The
Australians have now recognized, as have the Americans, that addressing the
problems these people currently face has a national priority. The difficult
issue is how to preserve what remains of their cultures while allowing them to
enter with full dignity into the mainstream of society.
Despite their predominantly English origins, both countries are comprised
of immigrant stock from many European cultures. Australia, however, had a
much more recent European immigration and now a very heavy Asian immigration. In the United States, European immigration waves not only occurred
somewhat earlier than in Australia, but also from a greater variety of European countries. Both countries until recently espoused the melting-pot philosophy and adopted. policies with respect to immigrants which attempted to
discourage or submerge the subcultures of their citizens in order to promote
national unity. 9 The educational system was the principal means for integrating immigrants into the British culture.' 0 Both countries have only
recently begun to question the validity of assimilationist policies and to
explore the value of cultural pluralism, and the role that the educational
system should play.
In the field of education policy, there are also some common aspects.
Both countries have highly developed educational systems which extend from
HAY & R. ROTUNDA, THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL SYSTEM 1-25 (1982);J. MCMILLAN, G.
STOREY, AUSTRALIA'S CONSTITUTION: TIME FOR CHANGE? 39-48 (1983).
See generally P. HAY & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 6; Hutley, The Legal Traditions of Australia as

6. See P.
& H.

EVANS,

7.
Contrasted with those of the United States, 55 AusTL. LJ. 63, 70 (1983). In the case of the United States,

major responsibilities and powers are also delegated by the states to local authorities.
8. Australia, of course, is not nearly as industrialized as the United States.
9. See generally D. TYACK, TURNING POINTS IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL HISTORY 123-24, 228-63
(1967).
10.

Id.
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preschool through higher education. In both countries, although public education constitutes the major sector, private schools are an important part of
the educational pattern.'I Indeed, there is some evidence in both countries of
an upward trend in private school enrollments.
Both countries divide responsibility for education between state and federal governments, as a result of constitutional provisions and other legal and
administrative requirements. Both are attempting to implement the goal of
equality of educational opportunity while also seeking to ensure freedom of
choice, the attainment of appropriate standards, and the promotion of social
cohesion. In seeking to achieve these goals, the two countries must deal with
federal-state political and fiscal relationships, sharply declining birthrates,
large ethnic minority groups, and the fact that education no longer has as high
2
a priority as other public needs.'
Finally, the pattern of intervention in education on the part of the federal
government has been similar in the two countries.' 3 Both countries relatively
recently increased the federal role in education even though the states have
the constitutional responsibility for education. For the first half of the twentieth century, there were only sporadic, incremental federal aid-to-education
programs in both countries, and there were no federal civil rights mandates in
either country. Sputnik was the impetus in Australia as well as in the United
States for the first major aid-to-education program. Sputnik triggered the
National Defense Education Act of 1958 in the United States.' 4 It took Australia a little while longer, but in 1964 the Science Laboratories Act, which was
to provide federal funds for improving science education and training (as did
5
the NDEA), was passed.'
In 1965, the United States enacted a multibillion dollar act, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 16 which along with other measures provided funds for compensatory education for disadvantaged children' 7 and for
school libraries.' 8 Similarly, in Australia, a significant federal aid-to-education act, the States Grants (Schools) Act 1973, provided funds for disadvantaged children and for school libraries along with other specific purpose
11. A higher proportion of students go to private schools in Australia than in the United States
and "nongovernment" schools (both religious and secular) receive public funds.
12. See Levin, Equal Educational Opportunity for Special Pupil Populations and the Federal Role, 85 W.
VA.

L.

REV.

159, 183 (1983). But see

NAT'L COMM'N ON EXCELLENCE,

A

NATION AT RISK: THE IMPERA-

(1983).
13. When the Labor government came to power in 1972 in Australia, education was split off
from the Department of Science and Education and a new Department of Education was created.
Interview with Kim Beazley, former Minister of Education (June 1980); Interview with KennethJones
(June 1980). Similarly, the U.S. Department of Education was separated from the Department of
Health, Education & Welfare (now the Department of Health and Human Services) in 1979. See
Department of Education Organization Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-88, 93 Stat. 668 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3510 (1982)).
14. Pub. L. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580 (1958) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 401-589 (1982)).
15. States Grants (Science Laboratories and Technical Training) Act 1964, 1964 Austl. Acts 246.
16. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20
TIVE FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM

U.S.C.).
17.
18.

Id. tit. I, 79 Stat. at 27-36 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 (1982)).
Id. tit. II, 79 Stat. at 36-39 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 2881-2887 (1982)).

Page 213: Spring 1985]

AUSTRALIA

grants. 19
Despite these similarities, there are also significant differences between
Australia and the United States and these differences must be kept in mind in
comparing the federal role in education in the two countries. They differ
vastly in the size of their population - Australia's population of fourteen million is in stark contrast to the 236 million of the United States - and in
number of political divisions - Australia has only six states 20 and two territories. 2 ' Moreover, in Australia, a local government system with only limited
powers evolved and thus there is no locally organized educational system.
The original settlements were at the coastal ports, and most of the population
remains along the coast today. The tremendous number of local authorities
and special districts, each with its own taxing authority, that are found in the
United States-school districts, fire districts, water districts, and mosquito
abatement districts, for example, as well as counties, cities, and townshipsdoes not exist in Australia.
The population in the United States is not only much larger, it is also
much more diverse. 2 2 Thus the United States has both greater complexity in
its governmental structure and more diverse special interests. This greater
diversity and complexity has, in large part, been responsible for the proliferation of categorical programs at both state and federal levels, in contrast to
what has occurred in Australia.
Both Australia and the United States have written constitutions. Despite
similarities both in documentary language and in the structure of government
set up in these constitutions, 2 3 however, there are some fundamental differ19. States Grants (Schools) Act 1973, 1973 Austl. Acts 1407. Australia's act went beyond categorical funding, however, and included funds for general operating and capital expenses, for both
public and private schools. See infra text accompanying notes 96-97.
20. An act of the British Parliament brought the Commonwealth of Australia into being on January 1, 1901, as a federation of six self-governing British colonies: New South Wales (capital:
Sydney), Victoria (capital: Melbourne), South Australia (capital: Adelaide), Queensland (capital: Brisbane), Tasmania (capital: Hobart), and Western Australia (capital: Perth). Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., ch. 12.
21. The Northern Territory remains a territory administered by the Commonwealth. Australian
Capital Territory (ACT) is the area in which the Australian capital, Canberra, is located. The Australian Constitution provides that "[tihe seat of Government of the Commonwealth shall be determined
by the Parliament.

. ..

.

AUSTL. CONST. § 125.

In 1908 a 911 square mile area now known as the

Australian Capital Territory was chosen for this purpose; it was transferred to the Commonwealth by
the State of New South Wales in 1911. Administered by the federal government, the Territory contains large areas of land set aside for parks, natural reserves, and other public purposes, as well as
Canberra, the national capital.
22. The lack of racial and ethnic diversity has its origins in the "white Australia" policy. With
the exception of its small aboriginal population, Australia at the time of federation was more than 98
percent white. One of the first statutes enacted by the Parliament of the new Commonwealth, the
Immigration Restriction Act 1901, 1901-2 Austl. Acts 252 (repealed 1958), helped ensure that Australia remained so. Section 3(a) of the Act excluded "[a]ny person who when asked to do so by an
officer fails to write out at dictation and sign in the presence of the officer a passage of fifty words in
length in an [sic] European language directed by the officer." This test remained in effect until 1958.
It has been pointed out that no unwanted immigrant could satisfy the dictation test, as "all an officer
had to do was select a language that the applicant did not know." W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS,
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND COMMENTARIES 69 (1977). This test was used to keep
out southern Europeans as well as Asians, Africans, and Middle Easterners. Id..
23. See supra text accompanying notes 3-4.
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ences. The Australian Constitution contains no such guarantees of fundamental rights and individual freedoms as appear in the U.S. Constitution's Bill
of Rights and fourteenth amendment. Moreover, the structure of government
established in the Australian Constitution is that of a parliamentary system.
The possibility of an independently elected executive and the marked separation of the executive and the legislative branches found in the American
system are absent from the Australian Constitution, which requires that all
Commonwealth ministers be elected members of the Senate or House of
Representatives 24
There are a number of important differences between the two legal systems which may be explained in part by the physical differences between the
two countries and in part by the way in which the two countries gained independence. The United States had seemingly limitless expanses of rich, arable
land and inexhaustible supplies of valuable natural resources. On the other
hand, "[i]n Australia, the law bears the imprint of the limitless expanse of the
land, but also of the poverty of the soil, the arid climate, and the absence of
resources except minerals." ' 2 5 Although the country (an island continent
actually) is about the size of the United States, excluding Alaska, it is "the
driest, flattest and most barren land of comparable size on earth." 26 The population was sparse prior to federation and remains so today. The sparseness
of the population meant that there were no local institutions, and that govern27
ance - under one system of laws - was centralized at the state level.
Moreover, Australia is a country that "obtained the advantages of independence without having to fight for it."28 Its isolation meant that there was no
danger of external enemies, and the Aboriginal population presented no
serious obstacle to white settlers. There was no necessity to formulate an ideology to rally forces, as was needed in the United States to fight Great Britain
and later to fight for the preservation of the Union. Thus, the United States
appears to have more of an "ideological" constitution and an "ideological"
29
legal system than is evident in Australia.
For this reason, one of the major differences between the two countries
lies in the role that the constitution plays. Although the justices of the High
Court of Australia from time to time emphasize that the document they are
construing is a constitution, 30 it has also been said that they construe the con24. AUSTL. CONST. § 64.
25. Hutley, supra note 7, at 63.
26. Id.
27. See id. at 63-64.
28. Id. at 65.
29. See id. The Commonwealth that emerged in 1901, after ten years of consultation and hard
bargaining, "was no Phoenix arising from the ashes of revolution or disaster; it was begotten of no
great surge of political idealism; it was in fact the child of as hard-headed a mariage de convenance as
was ever raised in the salons of France." Anderson, The States and Relations with the Commonwealth, in
ESSAYS ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 93 (R. Else-Mitchell 2d ed. 1961).
is a Constitution we are interpreting, an instrument of government meant to endure
30. "[I]t
and conferring powers expressed in general propositions wide enough to be capable of flexible
application to changing circumstances." Australian Nat'l Airways Proprietary, Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 71 C.L.R. 29, 81 (Austl. 1945) (Dixon, J.).
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stitution exactly as they would a will. 3 l Treating the constitution as an ordinary British statute means that it has not acquired the sacred aura which
surrounds the American Constitution; it does not enunciate any moral principles. Partly for this reason, the Australian Constitution contains no guarantee
32
of rights analogous to those articulated in the U.S. Bill of Rights.
Another fundamental difference between Australia and the United States
is the relatively greater homogeneity of Australian law. In Australia the states,
when they entered the Federation, had already adopted English law, while
some states in the United States 3 3 had a different system of law in existence
when they became part of the Union. One factor lessening the diversity of law
among the Australian states is the dominance of English traditions in the
training of lawyers and organization of the legal profession. Another factor is
the possibility of appeal to the Privy Council of Great Britain from Australian
state courts in state matters; until very recently, appeals could also be taken
31. Hutley, supra note 7, at 65; see also W. MURPHY & J. TANENHAUS, supra note 22, at 77-78.
32. This omission is the result of a conscious decision by the framers of the Australian Constitution, who, in drafting their own document, had before them the American Constitution but deliberately excised substantially all of the Bill of Rights. See Hutley, supra note 7, at 65. An Australian
Chief Justice, Sir Owen Dixon, explained to an American audience that "this silence . . . reflected
the firm confidence of the framers in the traditions and institutions of Parliamentary democracy." J.
LA NAUZE, supra note 3, at 227. "Why, asked the Australian democrats, should doubt be thrown on
the wisdom and safety of entrusting to the chosen representatives of the people sitting either in the
federal Parliament or in the State Parliaments all legislative power, substantially without fetter or
restriction?" 0. Dixon, Two Constitutions Compared, in JESTING PILATE 100, 102 (1965), quoted inJ. LA
NAUZE, supra note 3, at 227. This explanation may "account for the absence of such American guarantees as those against the quartering of soldiers in private houses in time of peace, and against
unusual and cruel punishments: these and other such relics of the eighteenth century were (as it
seemed in the 1890s) forever obsolete." J. LA NAUZE, supra note 3, at 227. It does not, however,
account for the absence of some of the other American guarantees such as equal protection.
The 1891 draft had included the following clause, adopted without debate: "[a] State shall not
make or enforce any law abridging any privileges of citizens of other States, nor shall a State deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protections of the laws." Id. at 230. This was clearly
based on the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, though it omitted "due process of
law"; it also resembled art. IV, section 2 "in referring to citizens of States rather than of the federation." In the end, however, proposals to include such provisions were defeated. Id. In part, the
proposals' defeat resulted from an opponent pointing out that the equivalent phrases in the U.S.
Constitution had been provided mainly to protect emancipated Negroes after the Civil War, and
could be very difficult to interpret. Later in the debate, the issue was raised again by pointing to
lower court decisions in the United States which were by no means confined to those involving
Negroes. A debate ensued on the meaning and definition of "citizens of the Commonwealth" and
finally, section 117 was adopted, reflecting only the privileges and immunities clauses of the U.S.
Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 2. Section 117 has had no discernible
constitutional significance in the ensuing years. J. LA NAUZE, supra note 3, at 229.
There were other, less generous, reasons for rejecting references to "equal protection." One was
a concern about the validity of state legislation that discriminated against nonwhites. For example,
the State of Victoria had factory laws that discriminated against the Chinese and the State of Western
Australia had laws prohibiting Asian or African aliens from mining gold. These examples were
raised by a number of delegates and soon other apprehensions about interference with state legislation began to appear. One of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention has been quoted as
follows: "[W]e want, as I understand it, to prohibit any discrimination which is based upon false
principle . . . we want a discrimination based on colour." Statement of Henry Bournes Higgins,
quoted in Evans, The Most Dangerous Branch? The High Court and the Constitution in a Changing Society, in
AUSTRALIAN LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE 13, 17 (D. Hambly &J. Goldring eds. 1976).

33.

E.g., California, Louisiana, and Texas.
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from the High Court to the Privy Council. 34 One of the objectives of the Privy
Council was to promote the uniformity of law throughout the British Empire.
The Privy Council said in Trimble v. Hill,3 5 an 1879 case on appeal from the
Supreme Court of New South Wales, that "it is of the utmost importance that
in all parts of the empire where English law prevails, the interpretation of that
law by the Courts should be as nearly as possible the same." 36 The High
Court of Australia accepted this principle and, on a number of occasions,
reversed its own previous decisions to bring them into line with decisions of
37
the Privy Council.
Also affecting the lack of diversity in Australian law is the fact that the High
Court is the final court of appeal for all state courts, even on state matters, 38
as well as for the new system of federal courts. 39 The High Court is therefore
the final court of appeal on all legal questions in Australia, subject only to the
remnants of power still vested in the Privy Council. Thus there is no limit on
the jurisdiction of the High Court equivalent to the limitations imposed on
40
the U.S. Supreme Court by article III of the U.S. Constitution.
34. The Privy Council (Appeals from the High Court) Act 1975, 1975 Austl. Acts 225, abolished
all appeals from the High Court.
35. 5 App. Cas. 342 (P.C. 1879).

36. Id. at 345.
37. See Hutley, supra note 7, at 68 (and cases cited therein).
38. Although the section of the Australian Constitution dealing with judicial power is modeled
after article III of the U.S. Constitution, there are considerable differences. Section 71 of the Australian Constitution provides: "The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal
Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia, and in such other federal courts as the
Parliament creates, and in such other courts as it invests with federal jurisdiction." Section 77(iii)
authorizes Parliament to make laws "[i]nvesting any court of a State with federal jurisdiction." Thus,
rather than creating a comprehensive system of federal courts, as in the United States, the Judiciary
Act 1903 established only one federal tribunal, the High Court. Judiciary Act 1903, § 4, 1903 Austl.
Acts 8, 9 (amended 1976). Sweeping federal jurisdiction was then granted to the state court systems.
With the exception of the specialized federal tribunals, established in 1976, see infra note 39, this
situation continues today.
39. Judiciary Act 1903, 1903 Austl. Acts 8, as amended by Judiciary Amendment Act 1976, 1976
Austl. Acts 1378. The Federal Court of Australia was established by the Federal Court of Australia
Act 1976, 1976 Austl. Acts 1323. This Act confers original jurisdiction in "matters arising under laws
made by Parliament." Id. § 19(1), 1976 Austl. Acts at 1330. The Industrial Division of the Federal
Court handles labor questions such as conciliation and arbitration, while the General Division of the
Federal Court handles matters involving bankruptcy, copyright, administrative law, consumer protection, restrictive trade practices, and price justification (i.e., antitrust cases). There is also a separate
federal Family Court, created in 1975 and given exclusive jurisdiction to handle cases arising under
the Commonwealth Family Law Act, with a direct appeal by special leave to the High Court. The
Federal Court has appellate jurisdiction in three kinds of cases: (1) appeals from the judgments,
decrees, or orders and sentences of a single federal judge, Federal Court of Australia Act 1976,
§ 24(l)(a), 1976 Austl. Acts at 1331; (2) general appeals, civil and criminal, from a supreme court of
a territory, id. § 24(1)(b), 1976 Austi. Acts at 1331; and (3) appeals, pursuant to a specific provision of
an act of Parliament, from a single-judge state supreme court exercising federal jurisdiction, id.
§ 24(1)(c), 1976 Austl. Acts at 1331. Crawford, The New Structure of Australian Courts, 6 ADELAIDE L.
REV. 201 (1978). See generally Lane, The New FederalJurisdiction, 54 AUSTL. L.J. 11 (1980).
40. The High Court's procedures are somewhat different from those of the U.S. Supreme
Court. The justices do not normally sit en banc, but in panels which, in cases arising under the
Court's appellate jurisdiction, must consist of two or more justices. (In cases coming to the Court
under its original jurisdiction, a single justice sits as trial judge. His findings are then referred to the
full court-which may be as few as two justices-which then proceeds as in other appeals.) Normally,
three members hear routine private-law appeals, but five to seven members sit in more important
litigation and, when there is a constitutional case of significance, the court tries to sit en banc. Inter-
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Finally, and of most importance in understanding the differences between
the two countries with respect to the federal role in education, the Australian
federal constitution addresses itself much more to the mechanics of government than to checks and balances at the federal level. Rather than a concern
for the balance of power among the three branches of the federal government, the emphasis in Australia is on an appropriate balance between the
41
Commonwealth and the states.

II
THE PRESENT FEDERAL ROLE IN EDUCATION IN AUSTRALIA

A.

The Historical Role of the Commonwealth in Education

In Australia, the states existed before the establishment of the Commonwealth in 1901,42 and thus the state constitutions predate the Commonwealth

constitution. The state constitutions empower their legislatures to provide
for "peace, order, and good government," 43 thus giving the states authority
view with Mr. Justice Lionel Murphy (July 8, 1983) (memorandum on file with the author). Since
Section 23(i) of the Judiciary Act requires at least three justices to concur in a decision (but not an
opinion) settling a question involving the Commonwealth's constitutional powers, at least five justices must participate in constitutional cases. SeeJudiciary Act 1903, § 23(i), 1903 Austl. Acts 8, 12
(amended 1976).
Cases are presented almost entirely through oral argument; written briefs are not submitted.
Oral argument is unlimited; for example, Commonwealth v. Tasmania (The Tasmanian Dam Case),
46 Austl. L.R. 625 (1983) (discussed infra, text accompanying notes 161-206) took 8 days to argue.
Id. at 625; Interview with Mr. Justice Murphy, supra. The Communist Party Case, Australian Communist
Party v. Commonwealth, 83 C.L.R. I (Austl. 1951), took 24 days. Even routine cases take half a day.
Determining the ratio decidendi for any particular judgment is extremely difficult, since each justice
generally writes his own separate opinion. According to Justice Murphy, the justices did not meet to
vote on the cases. Although each justice writes his own opinion, they do, of course, see copies of
their colleagues' opinions before they are released to the public. However, the justices sometimes
may not know the outcome of the case until the pro and con opinions are counted up. Interview with
Mr. Justice Murphy, supra.
In accordance with section 35 of the Judiciary Act 1903, as amended by Judiciary Amendment Act
1976, 1976 Austl. Acts 1378, 1379-80, there is an appeal as of right from state supreme courts only
with respect to judgments of a full state supreme court involving at least $20,000 or a matter of
constitutional interpretation. All other appeals, including those from a single-judge state supreme
court, require special leave. Special leave is granted only under "exceptional circumstances." Cf
Mason, Where Now?, 49 AUSTL. L.J. 570, 576 (1975). In addition, cases can be removed to the High
Court in two circumstances: (1)in constitutional cases, before judgment by a lower appellate court,
on application of a state or Commonwealth Attorney-General or, at the discretion of the High Court,
on application and a showing of special cause by a party, Judiciary Act 1903, § 40(l), as amended by
Judiciary Amendment Act 1976, 1976 Austl. Acts 1378, 1380; or (2) in nonconstitutional cases
involving the exercise of federal jurisdiction (identified in Sections 75 and 76 of the constitution), id.
§ 40(2)(b), as amended by Judiciary Amendment Act 1976, 1976 Austl. Acts at 1381. In nonconstitutional cases, removal is always a matter for High Court discretion and requires the consent of all
parties. Id. § 40(4), as amended by Judiciary Amendment Act 1976, 1976 Austl. Acts at 1381.
41. The federal system in Australia, like that in the United States, is a limited government,
having only those powers that are specifically enumerated. Section 107 of the Australian Constitution is similar to the U.S. Constitution's tenth amendment, differing, however, in its use of the words
"unless... exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the State." AUSTL. CONST. § 107 (emphasis added).
42. The last state to be established was Western Australia in 1890.
43. See, e.g., N.S.W. CONST. § 5 (enacted by Constitution Act 1902, 2 N.S.W. PUB. ACTS 340, 342
(1938)).
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over all social services. Relying on such provisions, the states have enacted
public instruction acts. 4 4 Like the U.S. Constitution, the Australian Constitution contains no education provision. Since section 106 of the Australian
Constitution saves the states' constitutions at the time of federation, 45 and
46
sections 107 and 108 save the laws and powers of the state governments,
education appears to have been a matter constitutionally left to the states.
Educational policy is still determined primarily by the states, though the
delegation of authority within each state differs. The determination of school
policy and authority to disburse funds may be formally or legally granted to
the State Minister of Education, the Director-General, 4 7 or the Governor.
While there are also various national committees and commissions with differing roles, virtually all school policy is determined at the state level. There
is no counterpart to the local education agencies or school boards found in

the United States 4 8 nor, at the other end of the spectrum, was there until
recently any significant effort on the part of the Commonwealth to exert influence over educational policy.
One such attempted exercise of power by the Commonwealth government
was based on the defense power, 4 9 resulting in a High Court decision
declaring that the states had responsibility for education in the Australian federal system. 50 In that case, an applicant had met all the requirements for university matriculation and admission to either the faculty of medicine or the
faculty of dentistry. The plaintiffis application for admission was denied pur44. See, e.g., Public Instruction Act of 1880, 9 N.S.W. PUB. ACTS 390 (1957) (amended 1979);
Education Act 1928-1981, 19 Geo. 5, no. xxxiii, 5 W. AUSTL. REPR. ACTS 1 (1982).
45. "The Constitution of each State of the Commonwealth shall, subject to this Constitution,
continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of
the State, as the case may be, until altered in accordance with the Constitution of the State." AusTL.
CONST.

§ 106.

46.
Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes a State, shall,
unless it is by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or
withdrawn from the Parliament of the State, continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the State, as the case may be.
AusTL. CONST. § 107.
Every law in force in a Colony which has become or becomes a State, and relating to any matter
within the powers of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, shall, subject to this Constitution,
continue in force in the State; and, until provision is made in that behalf by the Parliament of the
Commonwealth, the Parliament of the State shall have such powers of alteration and of repeal in
respect of any such law as the Parliament of the Colony had until the Colony became a State.
AUSTL. CONST. § 108.

47. The Director-General is the permanent head of the state education department. The position is equivalent to that of a state commissioner or superintendent of education in the United States,
although it is never an elected position. It is different, however, in that the state Minister of Education establishes policy, and the Director-General implements it - although in many cases, a
Director-General is quite influential in the development of major educational policy changes. Educational policies are approved by the Minister but often shaped by the Director-General. Interview
with Dr. Robert Vickery, Director-General of the Department of Education of Western Australia (July
5, 1983) (memorandum on file with the author).
48. Victoria has recently established local school boards or councils that are elected. However,
there is no local responsibility for revenue raising or for the hiring and promotion of teachers. Interview with Dr. Robert Vickery, Director-General of the Department of Education of Western Australia
(July 12, 1983) (memorandum on file with author).
49. AusTL. CONST. § 51(vi).
50. The King v. University of Sydney, 67 C.L.R. 95 (Austl. 1943).
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suant to national security regulations which gave power to the Commonwealth to "regulate, restrict or enlarge the number of students who may be
enrolled in any faculty or course of study at that University." 5' The regulations were promulgated under the authority of the National Security Act
which provided that appropriate regulations could be enacted "for securing
the public safety and the defense of the Commonwealth" or "for prescribing
all matters which are necessary or convenient to be prescribed, for the effectual prosecution" of the war. 52 A quota had been established, and the seats
had already been filled when the plaintiff applied. A majority of the High
Court found the regulation to be an invalid exercise of Commonwealth
power, related not to defense but to education, which the Court said was a
function of the states.
In 1946, the Commonwealth Constitution was amended to permit the
Commonwealth Parliament "to make laws

.

.

.

with respect to

. .

. benefits to

students.' ' This provision gives the federal government some authority over
education; however, the policy has still been to leave primary authority to the
states.
One major difference between the United States and Australia, historically,
has been the way in which education is financed. Although the Australian
states play the principal role in policy setting and decisionmaking in the Australian schools, the Commonwealth has the primary powers of revenue
raising. This revenue is partially directed back to the states, with discretion in
spending left to the states.
Based on section 51 (ii) (the taxing power) and the section 96 power to
51. Regulation 16(2)(a), National Security (Universities Commission) Regulations, 1943 Austi.
Stat. R. 28, at 773, 777.
52. National Security Act 1939-40, § 5(1), 1940 Austl. Acts 78, 79 (repealed 1950).
53. AUSTL. CONST. § 51(xxiiiA). After the High Court's decision in the PharmaceuticalBenefits
Case, Attorney-General for Victoria ex rel. Dale v. Commonwealth, 71 C.L.R. 237 (Austl. 1945), which
significantly restricted the scope of the Commonwealth's power under section 81 to appropriate
funds "for the purpose of the Commonwealth," the constitutional validity of all direct federal
spending programs not authorized by a particular fount of Commonwealth legislative power was in
question. Among the statutes thought questionable in whole or in part under the PharmaceuticalBenefits decision was the Education Act 1945, 1945 Austl. Acts 423 (intended "to establish a Commonwealth Office of Education and a Universities Commission, to provide for [schooling for veterans and
financial aid to university students], and for other purposes"). The Constitution Alteration (Social
Services) Act 1946, 1946 Austl. Acts 273, introduced to guarantee the validity of future federal welfare programs and to enable the Commonwealth to administer them, resulted in approval of section
51 (xxiiiA) by national referendum in 1946 and subsequent amendment of the constitution. See Sackville, Social Welfare in Australia: The ConstitutionalFramework, 5 FED. L. REV. 248, 256-57 (1973).
Federal Council of the British Medical Ass'n in Australia v. Commonwealth (The B.M.A. Case),
79 C.L.R. 201 (Austl. 1949) is the principal case interpreting section 51(xxiiiA). In that case, the
word "benefits" was given an expansive reading, to cover "provisions made to meet needs arising
from special conditions with a recognized incidence in communities or from particular situations or
pursuits such as that of a student, whether the provision takes the form of money payments or the
supply of things or services." The B.M.A. Case, 79 C.L.R. at 260 (Dixon, J.). The B.M.A. decision
indicated that the Commonwealth, in providing benefits, could impose whatever conditions it chose,
and that the section 51(xxiiiA) power is "limited to the provision of the specified benefits by the
Commonwealth itself" Sackville, supra at 260 (emphasis in original), and does not extend to legislation
dealing with benefits provided, for example, by the states, "public bodies," and trading corporations.
Id.
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make conditional grants, the Uniform Tax Scheme was introduced by the
Commonwealth in 1942. Up until that time, both the Commonwealth and the
states had taxed income, but there were significant variations among the
states in tax structure and rates. The Uniform Tax Scheme 54 altered this
arrangement. 5 5 A Commonwealth income tax was levied at a rate that would
yield the same amount as that previously raised by the Commonwealth and
the states combined; taxpayers were required to pay the Commonwealth
income tax before any state income tax. If a state refrained from imposing a
state income tax, it would receive from the Commonwealth an annual amount
equal to that which it had previously collected in income tax. If a state levied
any income tax at all, it would not get any portion of the Commonwealth's
income tax revenue.
Financial assistance was thus granted to a state on condition that it abstain
from exercising its own power to tax income. The effect was to force the
states to cede their power to tax income to the federal government. In effect,
Australia developed an extensive revenue-sharing program that has remained
in existence ever since. 5 6 "The proportion of total tax revenue collected by
the Commonwealth is about 80 per cent," 5 7 and it distributes about 30 per54. The Uniform Tax Scheme was based on four statutes. States Grants (Income Tax Reimbursement) Act 1942, 1942 Austl. Acts 46 (repealed 1946); Income Tax (War-Time Arrangements)
Act 1942, 1942 Austl. Acts 48; Income Tax Assessment Act 1942, 1942 Austl. Acts 52 (amended
1973); Income Tax Act 1942, 1942 Austl. Acts 64.
55. SeeJ. MCMILLAN, G. EVANS, & H. STOREY, supra note 6, at 108-09.
56. Although the scheme was a wartime measure, it has been continued to the present day. The
states challenged its validity twice. In the principal case, South Australia v. Commonwealth, 65
C.L.R. 373 (First Uniform Tax Case) (Austl. 1942), a majority of the High Court upheld the Uniform
Tax Scheme. The states had argued that sections 106 and 107 of the constitution prohibited either
the Commonwealth or the states from usurping or undermining the functions or constitution of the
other. Since taxation is an essential sovereign function, they argued, and principles of federalism
require limiting the scope of Commonwealth powers that are exercised in derogation of such functions, the scheme was unconstitutional. A majority of the High Court found that since the scheme
neither repealed state tax legislation nor required or compelled a state to abandon its taxing activities, but merely offered an inducement not to exercise power conceded to continue to exist, it was
constitutional. ChiefJustice Latham noted that the fact that in reality the states could not refuse to
take the Commonwealth grants and thus were forced to give up their taxing power was not dispositive of the constitutional issue: "temptation is not compulsion." 65 C.L.R. at 417. Chief Justice
Latham quotes from Justice Cardozo's majority opinion in Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S.
548, 589-90 (1936): "Every rebate... is in some measure a temptation. But to hold that motive or
temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge the law in endless difficulties." South Australia v.
Commonwealth, 65 C.L.R. at 418. The interpretation of sections 106 and 107 appears to be like that
of the tenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution, in that these sections merely make clear that the
Commonwealth is a government of limited powers. These sections do not limit or restrict those
powers (such as taxation) granted to the Commonwealth.
The states challenged the validity of the Uniform Tax Scheme again in 1957. Victoria v. Commonwealth, 99 C.L.R. 575 (Second Uniform Tax Case) (Austl. 1957). In response to this challenge,
the High Court ruled invalid the priority given to the Commonwealth income tax, but the remaining
elements of the scheme were upheld and those elements provided a sufficient basis for the Commonwealth to retain supremacy in the area of income tax. SeeJ. McMILLAN, G. EVANS & H. STOREY, supra
note 6, at 109. The states had also sought to invalidate the portion of the Uniform Tax Scheme
which, enacted pursuant to section 96, provided for financial assistance to those states that did not
collect state income tax. All members of the High Court concurred in giving section 96 the widest
possible scope: the Commonwealth can grant financial assistance to any state or to all and on
whatever terms or conditions it sees fit. 99 C.L.R. at 575.
57. J. McMILLAN, G. EVANS & H. STOREY, supra note 6, at 109. In effect, the States' capacity to
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cent of these revenues to the states, principally through tax reimbursement
grants but also using special equalization grants, 58 specific purpose grants,
and miscellaneous grants. The 30 percent distributed to the states constitutes
59
about two-thirds of the states' total revenue.
Thus, funds for education are substantially derived from consolidated revenues which are dispersed to the states as Parliament thinks "fit."

60

The

grants 6 1

Commonwealth government provides financial assistance
to the
states in a lump sum (as untied funds), and education is financed primarily out
of these tax reimbursements. This means that the financing inequities that
exist in the United States (both among states and among school districts
within each state) do not exist in Australia.
In addition to what might be called general revenue sharing, additional
Commonwealth funds specifically for education are distributed through specific purpose grants. Because inequities are relatively insignificant, this special federal funding for education actually operates to supplement or "top
up" the basic educational program. By contrast, in the United States, federal
funds for education often do not achieve this "topping up" effect because of
62
fiscal disparities between school districts and among states.
B.

Constitutional Power for Intervention in Education, the Role of the
Courts and of the Executive

1. ConstitutionalAuthority. Most of the Commonwealth's express legislative
powers are enumerated in section 51 of the constitution. 63 Section 51
includes forty express legislative powers with the following preamble to the
list of powers: "The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution, have power
to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to .... ." These enumerated legislative powers are concurrent, that is, the fact that these specific grants of power have been made to
the Commonwealth does not subtract anything from the states' general
powers to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the
states.64
raise revenues independently is confined to such minor taxes as the payroll tax, automobile tax,
stamp duties, probate and inheritance taxes, land tax, gambling tax, and liquor tax. Id. at 108.
58. See id.at 115-16.
59. Id. at 117.
60. AUSTL. CONST. § 96 (although section 81 is sometimes also relied upon).
61. "In 1959 the Commonwealth introduced a system of financial assistance grants in place of
the tax reimbursement arrangements. Under [this] system, grants increased not merely by reference
to changes in population and wages, but also in accordance with something called a 'betterment'
factor." J. MCMILLAN, G. EVANS & H. STOREY, supra note 6, at 122. Under the current scheme, introduced in 1982-83, the states share in a grant based on a fixed percentage, about 20 percent, of total
(not just income tax) Commonwealth taxation collections. Id. at 123.
62. For a discussion of the patterns of allocation of federal aid to education in the United States,
see generally J. BERKE & M. KIRST, FEDERAL AID TO EDUCATION: WHO BENEFITS? WHO GOVERNS?
(1972); Berke & Kirst, The Federal Role in American School Finance: A Fiscal and AdministrativeAnalysis, 61
GEO. L.J. 927 (1973).

63. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
64. Some of the legislative powers in section 51 are, of course, exclusive to the Commonwealth
because their subject matter is inherently beyond the competence of the states or because other parts
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As noted above, the only provision expressly referring to education is the
amendment adopted by referendum 6 5 in 1946, permitting the Commonwealth

Parliament to "make laws . . .with respect to . . .benefits to students." 66

This provision, however, does not appear to lend itself to a broad interpretation of the extent of Commonwealth power over education, or at least it has
not been so interpreted. Thus, with the almost total absence of express constitutional authority for federal intervention in education, coupled with the
absence of an Australian equivalent to the equal protection clause 6 7 from

which such authority might be implied, there appears to be no constitutional
basis for the Commonwealth's imposing on the states unfunded mandates
analogous to such U.S. statutes as Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and their implementing regulations. 6 8
One possible source of constitutional authority, however, may lie in the
external affairs power, 6 9 discussed in part III of this article. Another is section
96 of the Australian Constitution, similar to the taxing and spending clause of
the U.S. Constitution 70 which provides authority in this country for federal
grants-in-aid to education. The U.S. statutes frequently include extensive
conditions that operate similarly to some of the civil rights mandates. 7 1 The
U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly taken a broad view with respect to the
of the constitution exclude the states from acting in the area. See J. MCMILLAN, G. EVANS & H.
STOREY, supra note 6, at 42-43. See generally id. at 39-67.
Section 51 concludes with a provision that is similar to the "necessary and proper" clause in the
U.S. Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. The Australian provision states that Parliament shall
have power to make laws with respect to "matters incidental to the execution of any power vested by
this Constitution in the Parliament or in either House thereof, or in the Government of the Commonwealth, or in the Federal Judicature, or in any department or officer of the Commonwealth."
AUSTL. CONST. § 51(xxxix).
65. The principal mechanism for amending the Australian Constitution is by referendum under
section 128 of the constitution. That section provides that the proposed law for amending the constitution be passed by a majority of each house of the Parliament. Not less than two or more than six
months after its passage through both houses, the proposed law is to be submitted in each state to
the electors qualified to vote in that state for the election of members of the House of Representatives. A proposed law must be approved both by a majority of all the electorate voting and also by a
majority of the electors voting in a majority of the states. AUSTL. CONST. § 128. Those requirements
have proved very hard to satisfy. Since federation, only eight of thirty-six such proposed amendments have been approved. J. MCMILLAN, G. EVANS & H. STOREY, supra note 6, at 359.
66. AUSTL. CONST. § 51 (xxiiiA). The full provision covers a range of social services. Parliament
may legislate with respect to "the provision of maternity allowances, widows' pensions, child endowment, unemployment, pharmaceutical, sickness and hospital benefits, medical and dental services
(but not so as to authorize any form of civil conscription), benefits to students and family
allowances." AUSTL. CONST. § 51 (xxiiiA). See discussion supra note 53.
67. See discussion supra note 32.
68. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1982); 34 C.F.R. §§ 75, 76,
100, 222, 700 (1984); Education Amendments of 1972, tit. IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982); 34
C.F.R. §§ 106, 122 (1984); Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C § 794 (1982); 34 C.F.R.
§§ 104, 222, 300 (1984). Since these statutes withhold other federal funds when their provisions are
violated, the authority for these statutes may also lie in the taxing and spending power of article I,
section 8, clause I of the U.S. Constitution, as well as in section 5 of the fourteenth amendment.
69. AUSTL. CONST. § 51 (xxix).
70. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.1.
71. See, e.g., Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1232, 1401, 14051406, 1411-1420, 1453 (1982).
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scope of Congress' power to condition the receipt of federal grants enacted
pursuant to the spending clause. 72 Although the Australian provision explicitly
says any federal grant can be conditioned 73 whereas the U.S. approach has
been developed through court interpretation, there has been in Australia little
reliance on section 96 as a basis for extensive conditioning of specific purpose
grants,7 4 and Australia imposes relatively few conditions on those grants, at
least compared with the United States. Whether section 96 could be used as
authority for conditions such as those included in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act or Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education
Act will be discussed in part IV of this article.
2. The Role of the Courts. The policymaking role of courts in Australia is very
different from that of courts in the United States. At about the same time that
the legislative and executive branches of the federal government were
expanding their involvement in education, the U.S. federal courts began to
assume a significant policymaking role in the field of education beginning with
Brown v. Board of Education.75 Following Brown, for the remainder of the
1950's, the courts were primarily concerned with implementing the constitutional requirement that no student be denied an equal educational opportu72. In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968), where the Court upheld a condition of the Aid to
Families with Dependent Children program against state regulations which would have diminished
its effectiveness, the Court stated: "There is of course no question that the Federal Government,
unless barred by some controlling constitutional provision, may impose the terms and conditions
upon which its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed .... ." Id. at 333 n.34. Similar
statements have been made with respect to conditions imposed on federally funded construction
projects, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (10 percent of funds for public works
project required to be used to procure services or supplies from "minority business enterprises");
requirements under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 banning discrimination in "any program
or activity receiving Federal financial assistance," see Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 569 (1974) (failure
of school district to provide affirmative language assistance to students of Chinese ancestry who
spoke little or no English); and legislation providing that no state official employed "in connection
with any activities . . . financed in whole or in part by [federal funds] shall. . . take any active part in
political management or in political campaigns," see Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n,
330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947) (under Section 12(a) of the Hatch Act, 54 Stat. 767 (1940) (current version
at 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501(4), 1502 (1982)), agency may withhold funds in an amount equaling two years'
salary); see also, e.g., Pennhurst State School v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1981) (reaffirming power to
condition funds but finding no effective condition imposed). Although the Court has announced that
the power is not without limits, its attempts to articulate the content of those limits are remarkably
vague. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 17 n.13 (and cases cited therein). "Requiring States to honor the
obligations voluntarily assumed as a condition of federal funding . . . simply does not intrude on
their sovereignty. . . . If the conditions were valid, the State had no sovereign right to retain funds
without complying with those conditions." Bell v. New Jersey, 103 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (1983). National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), left open the question whether grant conditions that
intrude upon state sovereignty with respect to "integral operations of state governments" would be
upheld. Id. at 852 n.17. The D.C. Circuit has recently noted that the most diligent inquiry will not
"uncover any instance in which a court has invalidated a funding condition." Oklahoma v.
Schweiker, 655 F.2d 401, 406 (1981); see also cases cited id. at 406 n.9.
For a general description of specific grant conditions enacted pursuant to the spending clause,
see P. HAY & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 6, at 173-81.
73. "During a period of ten years after the establishment of the Commonwealth and thereafter
until the Parliament otherwise provides, the Parliament may grant financial assistance to any State on
such terms and conditions as the Parliament thinks fit." AUSTL. CONST. § 96.
74. See discussion infra at text accompanying notes 287-305.
75. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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nity because of his or her race. While their involvement in the dismantling of
dual school systems has continued unabated, 76 the U.S. courts have also
become involved in other areas which long had been the prerogative of school
authorities. 7 7 In the last 15 years, the U.S. Supreme Court has reviewed cases
involving nearly every major area of educational policy: school curriculum
questions, 78 student rights of free expression and of nondisruptive protest, 79
exemptions from state compulsory school attendance laws,8 0 school finance
reform,8 1 gender discrimination,8 2 discrimination against handicapped students, 8

3

bilingual or English-language instruction for those with limited Eng-

lish skills,8 4 school personnel policies,8 5 student discipline,8 6 and liability of
school officials for violating the civil rights of students.8 7 The involvement of
the lower federal courts and of state courts in educational issues has been
even more pervasive, including such areas as the tracking and classification of
89
students 8 and minimal competency testing.
There is no such tradition of court intervention in educational policy
issues in Australia. The federal courts are only 6 years old and do not have a
general "arising under" jurisdiction.9 0 Since the federal courts have a narrow
jurisdiction, most cases that might involve education would come up through
the state courts and then be appealed to the High Court. Most cases, how76. See e.g., Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 455 U.S. 934 (1982); Crawford v. Board of
Educ., 455 U.S. 904 (1982); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449 (1979).
77. See generally M. YUDOF, D. KIRP, T. VAN GEEL & B. LEVIN, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND THE LAW
(2d ed. 1984); Levin, The Courts, Congress, and EducationalAdequacy: The Equal Protection Predicament, 39
MD. L. REV. 187 (1979).
78. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
79. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
80. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
81. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
82. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
83. See, e.g., Irving Indep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984); Board of Educ. v. Rowley,
458 U.S. 176 (1982); Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
84. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
85. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Hortonville
Joint School Dist. No. I v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La
Fleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
86. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
87. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
88. See, e.g., Larry P. v. Riles, 502 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1974).
89. See, e.g., Debra P. v. Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405 (lth Cir. 1984).
The constitutional rights of teachers also expanded during the period of the sixties and early
seventies-encompassing such diverse areas as free speech, see, e.g., Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
School Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979); Mount Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and the ways in which teachers are certified, see, e.g., United States v. North Carolina, 400 F. Supp. 343 (E.D.N.C. 1975), vacated, 425 F. Supp.
789 (E.D.N.C. 1977), as well as issues involving the right to bargain collectively, see, e.g., McLaughlin
v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); National Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 512
P.2d 426 (1973); cf Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977), and to strike or apply other
sanctions, see, e.g., School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Ass'n, 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W. 2d 206 (1968), and
the right to bargain about various aspects of educational policy, see, e.g., City of Beloit v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Comm'n, 73 Wis. 2d 43, 242 N.W. 2d 231 (1976); San Mateo City School
Dist. v. Public Employment Relations Bd., 33 Cal. 3d 850, 663, P.2d 523, 191 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1983).
See generally, Edwards, The Emerging Duty to Bargain in the Public Sector, 71 MICH. L. REv. 885 (1973).
90. See supra note 39.
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ever, are not heard by the High Court as a matter of right.91 Moreover, even
if Australia had a tradition of court intervention in education, the results
would be very different there than in the United States, since the constitutional issues involving education that arise under the first, fourth, and fourteenth amendments in the United States would not arise in Australia.
3. The Role of the Executive. The federal structure for governing education in
Australia is headed by a Minister of Education, who is appointed by the party
in power and has a seat in Parliament. The Minister will change as the party
in control changes. There is also a Secretary of Education, a top civil servant,
who is the permanent head of the Department of Education. 9 2 The Secretary
of Education is responsible for administering funds for student aid, poli93
cymaking, and providing advice to the Minister.
Labor government reforms in 1972 created a Schools Commission whose
four full-time and six part-time members dispensed almost all specific purpose Commonwealth funds for elementary and secondary education,
including funds for nongovernment schools (with the principal exception of
funds for student aid). 94 Although the Commission has separate statutory
authority, it submits its budget to the Department of Education and to the
95
Secretary of Education.
C.

The Schools Commission's Statutory Authority
The States Grants (Schools) Act 1973 originated financial assistance to

91. See supra note 40.
92. When there has been a party change as a result of an election, if the incoming government
wishes to remove the Secretary of Education, it can only be done by transferring him to another
secretarial position in another department or by making him an ambassador to a foreign country,
since Department Secretaries carry ambassadorial rank. Interview with Peter Tannock (July 9, 1983);
Interview with Dr. Peter Wilenski (July 8, 1983) (memorandum on file with author).
93. Interview with Dr. Peter Wilenski, supra note 92. The major function of the Commonwealth
Education Department appears to be to process and handle applications for student assistance. The
Department provides assistance to students in secondary education who are 16-years-old and older
(about $16 per week, given to the student's parent). This stipend is to encourage students to stay in
school for the last few years and to encourage the parents not to rely on their children's earnings.
There is also a program of assistance to students enrolled in tertiary (higher) education. Since tertiary education is free, these grants are for living expenses; tertiary students receive the funds
directly. The major financial aid programs for youth are all strictly income-tested (need-based). Id.
The Department administers the Youth-to-Work Transition grants program, but the remaining
specific purpose grants programs are administered by the Commonwealth Schools Commission. See
infra text accompanying notes 94-95.
Although responsibility for running the schools in the Northern Territory was recently transferred from the Commonwealth to the Northern Territory, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT)
schools and those in other nonstate areas are run by the Commonwealth government, as are the
schools on the government aboriginal reserves.
94. In 1972, the Labor Party appointed the Interim Committee for the Australian Schools Commission. This Committee resulted in a report in 1973 (The Karmel Report-so named for Peter
Karmel, the Chair of the Committee) that led to the passage of the States Grants (Schools) Act 1973,
1973 Austl. Acts 1407, and the Schools Commission Act 1973, 1973 Austl. Acts 1398.
95. There is also a Tertiary Education Commission that gives out all Commonwealth higher
education money. Currently, all institutions of higher education are wholly supported by federal
funds.
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Australia's schools through specific purpose grants. 9 6 Special federal program funds for education were divided into seven categories, the first two
being essentially block grants:
(1) general building grants (capital costs);
(2) general recurrent expenditures (operating expenses);
(3) grants for school library projects;
(4) grants for both capital and operating expenses for disadvantaged schools;
(5) grants for special schools for the handicapped;
(6) grants for teacher development; and
(7) grants
for special experimental projects designed to promote innovation or
97
change.

These specific purpose funds are paid to the states with minimal conditions. The funds must be used by the state for the specified purposes, such as
building projects or recurring expenses in connection with government or
nongovernment primary and secondary schools in the state. 98 The state must
also furnish the Minister evidence, within six months after the end of the year
in which the payment is made, that the funds were spent for the designated
purpose. If the state fails to meet these two conditions, the state must repay
an amount equal to the payment it received. In addition, the state must report
statistical and other information with respect to its schools. Even for the more
narrowly focused grants, such as libraries or disadvantaged schools, there
appear to be no conditions other than that the funds be spent for the particular purpose (e.g., librarian training courses), and that there be some fiscal
accounting to the Commonwealth at the end of the grant period.
A federal policy which has only seven specific target areas (two of which
are essentially block grants for capital and operating expenses) is very different from the often complex federal education legislation in the United
States. 99 Moreover, the bulk of Australian expenditures for education are
financed by the states from the general revenue sharing funds returned to the
states by the Commonwealth under the 1942 Uniform Tax Scheme. 10 0 The
remainder comes from financial assistance provided by the Schools Commission under the States Grants (Schools) Act.' 0 ' The Schools Commission paid
96. States Grants (Schools) Act 1973, 1973 Austl. Acts 1407.
97. Id. §§ 17-25, 1973 Austl. Acts at 1426-33.
98. See id. § 4(1), 1973 Austl. Acts at 1415. As noted earlier, recipients of specific purpose funds
include both public schools (called government schools in Australia) and nonpublic or parochial
schools (called nongovernment schools). Another condition is that the Commonwealth may not
fund a building project whose sole or principal object is either to increase the maximum number of
students that may be provided for at government primary or secondary schools in the state, or to
provide housing for teaching or other staff in any capital city. Id. § 5(1)(a)(i)-(ii), 1973 Austl. Acts at
1415.
99. Compare the statutory conditions attached to grants for disadvantaged schools in the States
Grants (Schools) Act 1973, § 27, 1973 Austl. Acts 1407, 1414, with the conditions in Title I of the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 (1982). In Australia,
grants to the states for operating and capital expenses supplement the funds provided through consolidated revenues (these latter funds are not restricted to specific uses: states can decide what proportion to spend on highways, on education, and so forth).
100. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text.
101. A percentage of both the state funds (whose sources are partly Commonwealth revenue,
partly state revenue) and the Commonwealth specific purpose funds for education go to nongovern-
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about 50 percent of the states' total capital budget in 1983 (the usual figure is
closer to 30 percent) and 10 percent of the states' operating budget. This 10
percent is broken down into 7 percent for the "block grants" for general
operating costs in the States Grants (School Assistance) Act, known as "recurrent expenditure," and 3 percent for the five special purpose grants enumerated above.' 0 2 And, as already noted, there are only a limited number of
objectives or conditions for these grants, primarily having to do with fiscal
reporting.
Since the 1973 Act, Australia has only added two categories of functions
receiving specific purpose grants. One is migrant education, cormprised of
English-as-a-Second-Language (ESL) programs and part-time ethnic education programs designed'to teach a language other than English "that is the
first language of peoples who have migrated to Australia."' 0 3 The other is
multicultural education, which provides programs "designed to take account
of the culture of Aboriginal or immigrant peoples."'' 0 4 The current Commonwealth grants programs will be discussed in part IV of this article.
III
THE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS POWER

As the previous section indicated, Australia has not used its section 96
power significantly to condition specific purpose grants to protect special5
10
pupil populations, at least when compared with some of the U.S. statutes.
More important, the Australian Constitution has no guarantees of individual
rights and liberties, such as those that appear in the U.S. Constitution's Bill of
Rights and the fourteenth amendment, 10 6 that would provide the authority for
ment schools, including sectarian schools. See States Grants (Schools) Act 1973, scheds. 1-6, 1973
Austl. Acts 1407, 1456-59.
102. Interview with members of Commonwealth Schools Commission (July 8, 1983) (memorandum on file with author). For tables showing the disbursement of funds to the states, see States
Grants (Schools Assistance) Amendment Act 1982, 1982 Austl. Acts 276; States Grants (Schools) Act
1973, 1973 Austl. Acts 1407, 1456-59. Total funding for specific purpose education grants disbursed
by the Schools Commission doubled in the ten-year period since the passage of the initial act. Compare States Grants (Schools) Act 1973, 1973 Austl. Acts 1407, 1456-59 with States Grants (Schools
Assistance) Amendment Act 1982, 1982 Austl. Acts 276.
103. States Grants (Schools Assistance) Act 1982, § 3(1), 1982 Austl. Acts 1745, 1754.
104. Id., 1982 Austl. Acts at 1752.
105. Compare States Grants (Schools) Act 1973, §§ 35-42, 1973 Austl. Acts 1407, 1438-44
(Grants in Respect of Special Schools for Handicapped Children) with Education for All Handicapped Children Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982); compare States Grants (Schools) Act 1973, §§ 2634, 1973 Austl. Acts 1407, 1433-38 (Grants for Disadvantaged Schools) with Title I of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965, 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 (1982).
106. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. For various reasons, discussed supra note 32, the
founding fathers rejected the need to include in the Australian Constitution anything like the Bill of
Rights. Only a few guarantees, which have been narrowly interpreted, appear in the Australian Constitution. For example, AUSTL. CONST. § 51(xxxi) requires that the taking of property by the Commonwealth be on "just terms." Compare U.S. CONST. amend. V ("Private property [shall not] be taken
for public use, without just compensation"). Section 80 guarantees a trial by jury for any person
charged with an indictable Commonwealth offense. (This requirement has frequently been avoided
by providing that an offense can be tried summarily rather than by indictment.) Section 116 provides
that the Commonwealth "shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any
" This has been interreligious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion ....
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civil rights statutes.
The only attempt in Australia to establish broad-based human rights guarantees was made in 1973 by the Labor government. A human rights bill was
introduced in the Senate that would have invalidated Commonwealth and
state laws and practices that infringed a wide variety of fundamental rights
and freedoms.' 0 7 The authority for the human rights bill was said to be the
external affairs power, section 51 (xxix). The bill, however, was not voted on
in Parliament. 10 8
Several recent cases, however, have indicated that the external affairs
power, section 51(xxix), may be the source of constitutional authority for a
greater Commonwealth role in education, particularly in the civil rights area.
The two major cases dealing with the external affairs power are Koowarta v.
Bjelke-Petersen'0 9 and Commonwealth v. Tasmania (the Tasmanian Dam Case)." t 0
These cases drew upon the precedents developed in several earlier cases.
A.

Early Cases

The principal precedent case is The King v. Burgess, I which reviewed the
conviction of a pilot who flew intrastate'12 without a federal license in violation of regulations requiring such a license. The regulations were promulgated pursuant to an act implementing an international air navigation
convention. The High Court held that the Commonwealth could regulate
flights occurring wholly within a state since, as a signatory to the Paris Air
preted, however, to permit Commonwealth financial assistance to go to sectarian schools. See Victoria ex rel. Black v. Commonwealth, 146 C.L.R. 559 (Austl. 1980). See generally I. Birch, State-Aid at
the Bar: of DOGS and a Bone (Nov. 18, 1982) (unpublished manuscript) ("DOGS" refers to Defense
of Government Schools, the plaintiff organization in Victoria ex rel Black.). Moreover, since there is no
fourteenth amendment, the states are not similarly barred from interfering with the free exercise of
any religion or from establishing any religion. See Birch, Non-Public Education in the U.S. and Australia,
in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN EDUCATIONAL POLICY 203 (1983). Finally, section 117, paralleling the
privileges and immunities clauses both of article IV, section 2 and of section I of the fourteenth
amendment of the U.S. Constitution, provides that "a subject of the Queen, resident in any State,
shall not be subject in any other State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally
applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State."
This does not mean that Australia does not protect individual rights. There is heavy reliance on
various accepted practices and on the doctrine of natural justice which, for example, operates to
entitle an individual to notice and a heaing before being deprived of any right, liberty, or property.
J. MCMILLAN, G. EVANS & H. STOREY, supra note 6, at 320-21.
107. J. MCMILLAN, G. EVANS & H. STOREY, supra note 6, at 320.
108. In 1981, a Human Rights Commission was established by statute, Human Rights Commission Act 1981, 1981 Austl. Acts 254, based on the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966, Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). The Commission conducts research and educational activities,
advises whether Commonwealth legislation is compatible with the U.N. Covenant, and investigates
complaints of human rights violations. The Human Rights Commissioner, however, has no enforcement powers. See also Racial Discrimination Act 1975, 1975 Austl. Acts 347, discussed infra text
accompanying notes 129-34.
109. 39 Austl. L.R. 417 (1982).
110. 46Austl. L.R. 625 (1983).
111. 55 C.L.R. 608 (Austl. 1936).
112. Goya Henry was an eccentric stunt flyer who flew paying passengers in an ancient aircraft
over city areas. One story has it that he flew his plane under Sydney Harbour Bridge. See J.
MCMILLAN, G. EVANS & H. STOREY, supra note 6, at 59.
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Convention, the Commonwealth was obligated to control all domestic
airspace.
This case required the Court to examine the scope of section 51 (xxix). A
majority of the justices viewed that section as providing broad, independent
legislative power potentially reaching any subject matter that could be the
object of international agreement and limited only by express constitutional
prohibitions. Two justices would have extended the power beyond the implementation of an international agreement to reach "matters of concern to Australia as a member of the family of nations."" l 3 At the other end of the
spectrum, one justice would have limited the scope of the section 51(xxix)
power to legislation implementing only those international agreements which
bound the Commonwealth in reference to some matter "indisputably international in character"." 4 Another justice strongly implied that he would
require a treaty to be of "sufficient significance" to be a "legitimate" subject
of international concern, arguing that the section 51 (xxix) power was limited
by implied as well as express constitutional prohibitions.' 15
While the High Court in Burgess apparently endorsed the Commonwealth's
authorization to enact legislation pursuant to section 51 (xxix), it reversed the
defendant's conviction: four of the five justices required that there be fairly
strict congruence between the statute (and regulations) and the objectives of
the international agreement. The regulations in question were held invalid as
too incidental to the reach of the agreement. The dissenting justice on this
point, however, argued that once an act of Parliament was found to be within
the section 51(xxix) power, its implementation should be liberally construed
6
to include incidental subjects."
The Burgess case laid the groundwork for the use of the external affairs
power domestically. After Burgess, the major questions addressed in subsequent litigation have been (1) whether the subject matter of an international
agreement is an external affair and (2) to what extent the agreement can be
implemented domestically (how strict a congruence is required between the
international agreement and the domestic legislation)." 17
Airlines of N.S. W Proprietary, Ltd. v. New South Wales" 8 upheld regulations
governing intrastate aviation that were enacted to implement the Chicago
Convention on International Civil Aviation of 1944. The Court found these
regulations "appropriate and adapted""19 to the ends of the treaty, even
though the treaty itself did not specifically mention intrastate aviation. The
decision contains statements by a number of justices expressly recognizing
Commonwealth power under section 51(xxix) to legislate in areas normally
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
INT'L L.J.
118.
119.

55 C.L.R. 687 (Austl. 1936) (Evatt & McTiernan, JJ.).
Id. at 669 (Dixon, J.).
Id. at 658 (Stark, J.).
Id. at 659-60 (Stark, J.).
Van Son, The Australian Constitution: The External Affairs Power and Federalism, 12 CAL. W.
46, 54-55 (1982).
113 C.L.R. 54 (1965).
Id. at 86 (Barwick, C.J.).
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1 20
reserved to the states.
In The King v. Sharkey, 121 involving the conviction of a Communist leader in
Australia for seditious acts directed not at Australia but at a member of the
Dominion, Chief Justice Latham apparently went further. He indicated that
the existence of a treaty or convention was not a prerequisite to the exercise
of the section 51 (xxix) power. 12 2 Australia's desire to maintain "friendly relations with other dominions," he found, was a sufficient basis for legislation
authorized under that section. 12 3 It should be noted, however, that the case
involved a Crown Statute, later adopted by Australia, rather than original
24
Commonwealth legislation. 1

B.

The Koowarta Case

Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen,125 which upheld the Racial Discrimination Act
1975, arose when Koowarta, an Aborigine from Queensland, sought on behalf
of himself and members of his tribe to obtain a Crown leasehold on land in
Queensland. Negotiations led to a contract for the purchase of the lease.
Under both the contract and a Queensland law, sale or transfer of this lease
was subject to approval by the Queensland Minister of Lands. The Minister
denied approval because the request came within the declared policy of the
Queensland Cabinet: "The Queensland Government does not view
favourably proposals to acquire large areas of additional freehold or leasehold
12 6
land for development by Aborigines or aboriginal groups in isolation."'
Koowarta claimed that the Queensland Minister of Lands had acted unlawfully under the Racial Discrimination Act 1975, passed by the Commonwealth
to implement the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, 12 7 to which Australia was a signatory. Article 2(l) of
the Convention requires States Parties to "pursue by all appropriate means" a
policy of eliminating racial discrimination by any persons, groups, or organizations, "including legislation as required by circumstances."'' 2 8 Article V of
the Convention provides that
States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its
120. See, e.g., id. at 82 (Barwick, CJ.), 115 (KittoJ.), 125-26 (Taylor, J.). A related case was New
South Wales v. Commonwealth (the Submerged Lands Case), 135 C.L.R. 337 (Austl. 1975). In this
case, a Commonwealth act (enacted pursuant to an international convention) claimed Commonwealth jurisdiction of contiguous marine areas. The majority upheld the act against the states' claim
that if the subject matter is geographically external to Australia, there need not be any reciprocity of
international interests.
121. 79 C.L.R. 121 (Austl. 1949).
122. Id. at 135-38.
123. Id. at 137. A second justice agreed with this point. Id. at 163.
124. In an earlier case, Ffrost v. Stevenson, 58 C.L.R. 528 (Austl. 1937), two of five justices
would have upheld legislation providing for extradition of fugitives from New Guinea under section
51 (xxix). That legislation was based on a Crown act later adopted by Australia.
125. 39 Austl. L.R. 417 (1982).
126. Decision of September 1972, quoted in Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 420 (Gibbs, C.J.).
127. Openedfor signature March 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, G.A. Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6104 (1965) (hereinafter cited as International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination).
128. Id. art. 2(1).
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forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or
national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the
following rights: . ..the right to own property alone as well as in association with
others .... 129

Section 9 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 declares that it is
unlawful for a person to do any act involving a distinction, exclusion, restriction or
preference based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on
an equal footing, of any human right or fundamental freedom .... 130.

The Act adds that the reference to "a human right or fundamental freedom"
includes a reference to any right found in article V of the Convention.13 ' Section 12(1) of the Act specifically forbids discrimination in the sale or disposition of property. 3 2 The Act also created a right of action for a "person
aggrieved' 133 and provided remedies, including injunction and damages. 134
Koowarta brought suit under the Racial Discrimination Act. The defendants argued that the Act was unconstitutional, with the Court limiting argument to the validity of sections 9 and 12 of the Act under section 51 (xxix) of
35
the constitution.
The Koowarta case is significant because the Commonwealth legislation
dealt with purely domestic acts in the context of moral commitments found
appropriate by international agreement. Previous cases had dealt with less
abstract subject matter, such as internationally shared air or sea space or
crimes committed against or in other states. 36 The issue was thus more
clearly drawn in Koowarta: whether the Commonwealth, under section
51(xxix), could enact laws to implement any treaty on any subject matter,
despite express constitutional limitations on Commonwealth powers in relation to state powers.
The issue whether sections 9 and 12 of the Racial Discrimination Act were
129. Id. art. 5.
130. Racial Discrimination Act 1975, § 9(1), 1975 Austl. Acts 347, 352.
131. Id. § 9(2), 1975 Austl. Acts at 352.
132. Section 12(1) of the Act, 1975 Austl. Acts at 353, provides:
It is unlawful for a person, whether as a principal or agent(a) to refuse or fail to dispose of any estate or interest in land, or any residential or business
accommodation, to a second person;
(b) to dispose of such an estate or interest or such accommodation to a second person on
less favorable terms and conditions than those which are or would otherwise be offered;
(c) to treat a second person who is seeking to acquire or has acquired such an estate or
interest or such accommodation less favorably than other persons in the same
circumstances;
(d) to refuse to permit a second person to occupy any land or any residential or business
accommodation; or
(e) to terminate any estate or interest in land of a second person or the right of a second
person to occupy any land or any residential or business accommodation,
by reason of the race, colour or national or ethnic origin of that second person or of any relative
or associate of that second person.
133. Id. § 24(1), 1975 Austl. Acts at 357.
134. Id. § 25, 1975 Austl. Acts at 358.
135. Section 51(xxvi), which grants the Commonwealth legislative powers with respect to "the
people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws," was also involved.
136. See supra text accompanying notes 111-18.
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valid under the external affairs power had to be analyzed in two steps. First,
was the subject matter within the concept "external affairs"? Second, if so,
was the scope of the challenged legislation reasonably appropriately designed
to effectuate the obligation incurred? The State of Queensland conceded that
sections 9 and 12 conformed to the terms of the Convention. Thus the only

question was whether the subject matter fell within the concept of external
affairs. By a narrow three-to-four majority, the High Court held that the
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 was properly a law with respect to external
affairs.
The High Court majority consisted of Justices Mason, Murphy, Brennan
and Stephen. The first three took a broad view of what constituted an
"external affair." A subject matter, in their view, becomes an "external affair"
upon becoming the object of a treaty. Justice Mason held that any treaty obligation, if not entered into solely in order to be able to utilize the authority in
section 51(xxix), is an external affair, although exercise of that authority is
limited by any express or implied constitutional restrictions.1 37 The fact that
a power is normally reserved to the state, however, is not such a restriction.
According to Justice Mason, "[i]t is very difficult to see why [an implementing]
law would not be a law with respect to an external affair, once it is accepted
that the treaty is an external affair."' 3 8 The concept of "external affairs" is
fixed and unchanging. However, recent expansion in international cooperation raises the potential for Commonwealth activity in new legislative areas,
1 39
since "itis a Constitution we are interpreting."
Justice Mason seemed to go further, however, in maintaining that the
existence of "international concern" over a topic would create an "external
affair" within the meaning of section 51(xxix) even if Australia were not a
party to a treaty with respect to the topic. For him, as for Justice Murphy, the
existence of a treaty is not a necessary prerequisite to the exercise of the section 51(xxix) power. "[A] matter which is of external concern to Australia
having become the topic of international debate, discussion and negotiation
constitutes an external affair before Australia enters into a treaty relating to
'
it." 140 Any expansion of Commonwealth power into areas usually reserved to
the states is justified to the extent necessary to allow Australia to participate in
the international community. The rationale is that if Australia failed to meet
its obligations, it would become the object of international discussion, disap41
proval, and perhaps even enforcement action by international bodies.'
Having once determined that the subject matter is within the purview of
section 51 (xxix), Justice Mason takes the view that the power to enact imple137.

Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 460.

138.

Id. at 459.

139. Id. at 462 (quoting Australian Nat'l Airways Proprietary, Ltd. v. Commonwealth, 71 C.L.R.
29, 81 (Austl. 1945) (Dixon, J.)). This is obviously reminiscent of ChiefJustice Marshall's statement
"it is a constitution we are expounding." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)
(emphasis in original).
140. Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 466-67.
141. Id. at 468.
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menting legislation is broad and discretionary. As long as the legislation is
appropriate and adapted to the enforcement of the Convention, rather than
2
repugnant to it, the legislation should be upheld. 4
Justice Murphy, who also took a very broad approach, shared Justice
Mason's opinion that the existence of a treaty is not prerequisite to invoking
section 51(xxix) authorization. In his view, any act relating to matters of
international concern such as "observance in Australia of international standards of human rights"' 14 3 would provide the basis for laws reaching purely
domestic matters even if there is no international agreement. With regard to
racial discrimination, Justice Murphy noted that this century had seen the
"greatest recognition of and also the greatest denial of human rights in all
history."' 14 4 Moreover, various U.N. agencies, declarations, and conventions
had evidenced a great degree of international concern about the persistence
of racial discrimination.' 4 5 Certainly, the concern of the Commonwealth with
discrimination in Australia is related to its concern about discrimination elsewhere. "In the practical realm of international politics it would be futile for
Australia to criticize racial discrimination or other human rights violations in
46
other countries if it were to tolerate such discrimination within Australia."'
Like Justice Mason, Justice Murphy would not require precise congruence
between the implementing act under section 51(xxix) and the terms of the
47
international agreement. 1
Justice Brennan's opinion was somewhat more constrained, but he found
that "[i]f Australia, in the conduct of its relations with other nations, accepts a
treaty obligation with respect to an aspect of Australia's internal legal order,
the subject of the obligation thereby becomes

.

.

.

an external affair and a law

with respect to that subject [is within section 51(xxix)].' 4 8
The opinions of these three justices in Koowarta support a broad interpretation of the section 51 (xxix) power. However, Justice Stephen, whose vote
was necessary for a majority in favor of an interpretation of section 51 (xxix)
that permits legislation to reach domestic matters, heavily qualified his agreement with the plurality, and agreed with the dissenters that mere entry into an
international agreement does not generate an external affair. To come within
section 51 (xxix), it is not enough that a law effectuate a treaty obligation. A
"matter of international concern" must be involved, one which displays "the
capacity to affect a country's relations with other nations ...
."149 Thus, in
his view, though "external affairs" is a fixed concept, its content "lies very
much in the hands of the community of nations of which Australia forms a
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

See id. at 458, 465.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 471.
Id.
See id. at 472.
Id. at 487.
Id. at 453.
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part." 1 50 The prohibition of racial discrimination is clearly part of that content. Although it would appear that the Racial Discrimination Act is a Commonwealth intrusion into a legislative area previously exclusively left to the
states, this was not, according to Justice Stephen, a redistribution in the federal balance, but only a growth in the content of "external affairs" reflecting
"the new global concern for human rights and the international acknowledg...
151 In
ment of the need for universally recognized norms of conduct.
his view, the subject matter must have to do with "such of the public business
of the national government as relates to other nations or other things or circumstances outside Australia,"' 52 and any such legislation should receive
intense scrutiny to assure "general international concern" or "especial con53
cern to the relationship between Australia and [another] country."'
Chief Justice Gibbs led the dissent,' 54 taking the view that Commonwealth
laws implementing international agreements were invalid unless the provisions
to which they gave effect specifically addressed external affairs. According to
Justice Gibbs and the other dissenters, "external affairs" required that the
subject matter of the provision involve a relationship with other countries or
with persons or things outside Australia. The term "external affairs" as used
in section 51 (xxix) thus was not coextensive with the treatymaking power. In
this view, earlier cases, such as The King v.Burgess, 155 Airlines of N.S. W. Proprieta7y, Ltd. v. New South Wales 15 6 and New South Wales v. Commonwealth (the Submerged Lands Case)i57 "had, in themselves, an international element; they
affected the relations between Australia and other countries in some direct
way." 158
The Koowarta case presented a different issue: whether Parliament can,
under section 51(xxix), effectuate "a treaty which deals with a matter that is
entirely domestic and affects only Australians within Australia, and their relations to each other, and does not involve any trelationship [sic] between Australia or Australians and other countries or their citizens."'15 9 The only way in
which international obligations could be given domestic effect, under the constitution, would be by state law unless the subject matter is within express
grants of Commonwealth power elsewhere in the constitution. It could not,
however, be done through the external affairs power alone. Thus, as Justice
Wilson added in his dissenting opinion, the provisions of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 lacked the necessary external aspect, since the conduct those
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 454.
Id.
Id. at 449.
Id. at 453.

154. Id. at 419-45. Justice Aicken concurred in the dissent with no separate opinion, see id. at 41719, and Justice Wilson also joined in the dissent, to which he added "supplementary remarks." Id. at
475-82.
155. 55 C.L.R. 608 (Austl. 1936); see supra text accompanying notes II1-17.
156. 113 C.L.R. 54 (Austl. 1965); see supra text accompanying notes 118-20.
157. 135 C.L.R. 337 (Austl. 1975); see supra note 120.
158. Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 433.
159. Id. at 434.
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sections proscribed would only take place in the day-to-day interaction among
160
persons within Australia.
C.

The Tasmanian Dam Case

In 1983, the High Court, again by a four-to-three vote, handed down its
decision in the Tasmanian Dam Case. 161 That case involved actions stemming
from a convention that Australia had ratified in 1974, the Convention for the
Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. 16 2 The object of the
Convention was to establish "an effective system of collective protection of
the cultural and natural heritage of outstanding universal value."' 6 3 Under
the terms of the Convention, a World Heritage Committee was established. 164
The Committee was to establish criteria for inclusion of properties on a
World Heritage List and a List of World Heritage in Danger.' 6 5 States Parties
were required to make contributions to a World Heritage Fund to finance
assistance with respect to included (or potentially suitable) properties
166
approved by the Committee.
Various articles of the Convention established obligations on the part of
States Parties, primarily to protect and conserve property designated as a natural heritage situated on its territory. 16 7 The Australian National Parks and
Wildlife Conservation Act 1975,168 adopted pursuant to this Convention,
authorized the Governor-General of Australia to "make regulations for and in
relation to giving effect" to the Convention for the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage. 16 9 In September of 1981, the Premier of the
State of Tasmania wrote to Commonwealth Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser
requesting that several national parks in Tasmania be nominated for inclusion
on the World Heritage List, including the Gordon River-Below-Franklin Dam
area. In April 1982, the Prime Minister submitted his nomination of these
parks to the World Heritage Committee.
In June of that same year, a statute was enacted by the parliament of the
State of Tasmania authorizing construction of a dam, a power generating sta160. See id. at 477-78.
161. Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 46 Austl. L.R. 625 (1983).
162. Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, done Nov. 23,
1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226.
163. Id. preamble.
164. Id. art. 8.
165. Id. art. 11(5).
166. Id. art. 16.
167. Under article 4, States Parties recognize a "duty of ensuring the identification, protection,
conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural and natural heritage [as defined by articles I and 2] and situated on its territory .... ." Article 5 provides that each
State Party "shall endeavor, in so far as possible, and as appropriate for each country" to take specified measures in pursuit of that duty. Under article 6, States Parties "undertake . . . to give their
help in the identification, protection, conservation and preservation of. . . cultural and natural heritage . . . [and] not to take any deliberate measures which might damage [it] directly or indirectly
168.
169.

National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975, 1975 Austl. Acts 103.
Id. § 69, 1975 Austl. Acts at 128.
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tion, and other associated works on the Gordon River.' 70 At the time that the
authorization was adopted, the Premier of Tasmania (not the same Premier
who recommended that the area be listed as one of the World Heritage areas)
requested that Prime Minister Fraser withdraw the World Heritage nomination. Despite the fact that Fraser refused to withdraw the nomination, construction on the dam began. Areas of land were excised from the FranklinLower Gordon Wild Rivers National Park by the state and vested in the
Hydro-Electric Commission of Tasmania.
In December 1982, the World Heritage Committee, listing the three parks
as natural heritages, expressed concern at the possible destruction of national
and cultural features in the region as a result of the dam project. Extensive
flooding of both wilderness land and archeological sites was feared. The
Committee suggested that the property be placed on the World Heritage in
Danger list until the question of the construction of the dam was resolved.
When the Labor Party came to power in March 1983, it proceeded to enact
legislation and regulations with respect to the dam, putting the Commonwealth in direct confrontation with the State of Tasmania. One regulation,
pursuant to section 69 of the 1975 Act, forbade inter alia "construction of a
dam or associated works [or] . . . any act in the course of, or for the purpose
of," such construction; excavation; erection of buildings "or other substantial
structure[s];" killing or damaging any trees; or "carry[ing] out any other
works" without the consent of a Commonwealth Minister.' 7 ' The second section of that regulation went further and forbade any act "that is likely
adversely to affect the conservation or preservation of that area as part of the
world cultural heritage or natural heritage."' 72 A 1983 Commonwealth
statute' 7 3 identified specific properties, including the Franklin Dam area, as
subject to essentially the same prohibitions, noting that protection or conservation of the properties was "a matter of international obligation"; "necessary
or desirable for the purpose of giving effect to a treaty . . . or obtaining for
Australia any . . . benefit under a treaty"; and "a matter of international concern (whether or not it is also a matter of domestic concern)," because failure
to conserve or protect "would, or would be likely to, prejudice Australia's
74
relations with other countries."1
The State of Tasmania challenged both the regulations and the Act as ultra
vires and invalid. The validity of the regulations depended upon whether section 69 of the 1975 Act was valid as an exercise of the external affairs power
and whether the regulations themselves were "regulations for and in relation
to giving effect to the Convention."'' 7 5 The validity of sections 6 and 9 of the
170. Gordon River Hydro-Electric Power Development Act 1982, 1982 [Pt. 1] Tasm. Sess. Stat. 3.
171. Regulation 5(1), World Heritage (Western Tasmania Wilderness) Regulations (modified
March 1983), cited in The Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 AUSTL. L.R. at 640-41.
172. Id. Regulation 5(2), cited in The Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 641.
173. World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983, 1983 Austl. Acts - (unavailable at
publication).
174. See id. §§6,9.
175. The Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 675.
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1983 Act also depended upon whether they were valid exercises of the
76
external affairs power.'
The High Court upheld section 69 of the 1975 Act by a four-to-three vote,
but it found the regulations invalid. A four-person majority also upheld section 6 and part of section 9 of the 1983 Commonwealth Act, as well as the
regulations and proclamations made in accordance with those sections,
although the remainder of section 9 was found to be invalid. The net result
was to support the exercise of Commonwealth power over the State of Tasmania as within the external affairs power of section 51 (xxix), permitting the
prohibition of the dam project despite state legislation authorizing the construction of the dam.
The four-person majority included three members of the Koowarta v. BjelkePetersen17 7 majority: Justices Mason, Murphy, and Brennan. They were joined
by Justice Deane. 178 All of the justices in the majority were in agreement that
the existence of an international agreement on any subject matter supports
implementing laws, and that there is virtually no limit to the range of possible
subject matter. Thus, in the majority view, the section 51(xxix) power is, in
effect, coextensive with the executive treatymaking power as implemented by
the Parliament of the Commonwealth, subject only to a limited number of
express prohibitions contained elsewhere in the constitution. The mere fact
that the power was one generally reserved to the states would not prevent the
Commonwealth from enacting legislation concerning that subject matter area.
Justice Mason's opinion' 79 asserted that all that is required to justify legislation under the external affairs power is mutuality of interest between international parties or some benefit resulting from observance of the treaty. The
Court had to defer to Parliament on this issue. Because the law in question
was directed to the protection and conservation of the region, it was valid
even though its "impact on Tasmania's capacity to control development is
severe."' 180 Justice Murphy agreed with Justice Mason and added that it was
the electorate, not the Court, that should control any exercise of power in this
regard.' 8 1 If a matter was one of international concern, that fact alone would
'82
bring it within the definition of "external affairs."'

Justice Brennan's opinion 83 was not quite so broad. If a treaty did not
clearly impose an obligation, to justify Commonwealth legislation it must at
least evidence international concern over its subject matter. That is, the sub176. Tasmania raised several other arguments under various provisions of the constitution that
are not discussed in this article.
177. 39 Austl. L.R. 417 (1982); see supra notes 125-60 and accompanying text.
178. Justice Stephen had left the High Court to become Australia's Governor-General in 1982.
179. The Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 688-720.
180. Id. at 702. The case came at a time of economic recession in Australia, felt most acutely in
Tasmania. The Franklin River Dam was seen as a way of reducing the cost of power and employing
vast numbers of people in its building and related industries. Thus it was thought that this decision's
economic impact on Tasmania would be severe.
181. Id. at 728.
182. See id. at 729-30.
183. Id. at 760-97.
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ject must affect or be likely to affect Australia's relations with international
persons.' 8 4 Implementing laws must actually be conducive to the international convention, however.' 8 5 When the convention permits discretion, the
test for the Court would be whether any part of the implementing law is not
reasonably considered as appropriate to the treaty's goals.'8 6 Here, of course,
Justice Brennan felt that the Commonwealth act in question was appropriate.
Justice Deane, the new member of the majority, interpreted the external
affairs power very broadly.' 8 7 In his view, "responsible conduct of external
affairs . . .[requires] observance of the spirit as well as the letter of interna-

tional agreements. . .[in] pursuit of international objectives which cannot be
measured in terms of binding obligation."' 8 8 A treaty with a broad purpose
would permit wide discretion in implementing legislation. As long as the laws
were reasonably appropriate to the purposes of such agreements, they should
89

be upheld. 1

As they had been in Koowarta, the dissenters were led by Chief Justice
Gibbs.19 0 They emphasized that a majority of the Koowarta Court had rejected
the notion that mere entry into a treaty will support the exercise of the section
51 (xxix) power. Because Justice Stephen's opinion in Koowarta had been the
swing position, they contended that the High Court was required by notions
of precedent to formulate and apply an acceptable articulation of the "international in character" criterion set forth in his opinion. 19' The dissenters felt
that the preservation and conservation of natural and cultural heritage were
not nearly so important morally or politically as the elimination of racial discrimination, with which the Koowarta case had been concerned. 9 2 Moreover,
failure to meet the obligations of the Convention was not likely to affect Australia's relations with other nations.1'3 The dissenters also argued that the
fact that the Convention vested so much discretion in States Parties to determine how they would perform was an indication that international concern
was not that intense.194 Justice Gibbs interpreted Justice Stephen's position
in the Koowarta case as requiring consideration of the degree to which a treaty
affects Australia's relations with other nations and the extent to which it
embodies international intentions to act. 19 5 Finally, the Convention, in its
operative articles,' 9 6 created no binding obligations; rather, it expressed a
184.
hypocrisy
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
4-5.

Id. at 777. Justice Brennan said that in this case, unless Australia wished to "attribute
and cynicism to the international community," such relations would indeed be affected.
Id. at 782.
Id.
Id. at 798-834.
Id. at 805.
See id. at 805-06.
Id. at 633-87.
See supra text accompanying notes 149-53.
The Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 670.
Id. at 671.
Id.
Id. at 670.
Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, supra note 162, arts.
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consensus as to aspirations. The dissenters argued that the earlier cases of
The King v.Burgess1 9 7 and Airlines of N. S. W Proprietary,Ltd. v. New South Wales 198
strongly suggest that if no obligation is imposed on the Commonwealth by the
treaty, no obligations can be imposed on the states by the Commonwealth.1 9 9
Justice Gibbs went on to note that even if the treaty in this case were considered to represent an "external affair," the Commonwealth's implementing
legislation did not give effect to the international convention, that is, it did not
"perform the obligations or secure the benefits" that the international convention imposed or conferred. 20 0 If there is no obligation created, the Commonwealth can only attempt to persuade the states to pursue the goals of the
agreement. The Commonwealth, in his view, could not mandate protective
measures such as these because they went beyond the terms of the agreement
20 1
and were ultra vires under the Burgess case.
All members of the
court in the Tasmanian Dam Case purported to apply the
20 2
"congruence" test.

The difference in result on the question whether the

legislation is congruent with the obligations of the treaty depends on how the
"obligation" is characterized. The dissenting Justices, Gibbs, Wilson, and
Dawson, recognized no obligation.2 0 3 Justices Deane and Brennan, two members of the majority, required some degree of closeness of fit between the
obligation and the exercise of the section 51(xxix) power. 20 4 Justice Mason
was satisfied that the obligation was that of instituting a "regime of control"
with respect to protection and conservation of cultural and natural heritage
and that all operative provisions were "appropriate and adapted to the
desired end." 20 5 Justice Murphy merely stated that the operative sections

were "reasonably appropriate to implementation of the Convention."2 0 6
State officials and other commentators were highly critical of the Tasmanian
Dam decision. Premier Gray of Tasmania said that "decisions which have such
far-reaching effects on the constitution of this country should at least be
20 7
decided unanimously by the High Court and not be a majority decision."
197. 55 C.L.R. 608 (Austl. 1936); see supra text accompanying notes 111-17.
198. 113 C.L.R. 54 (Austl. 1965); see supra text accompanying notes 118-120.
199. The Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 671-75.
200. Id. at 671.
201. In Airlines of N.S. W Proprietary,Ltd., Chief Justice Barwick said, in an often-quoted passage:
But where a law is to be justified under the external affairs power by reference to the existence of
a treaty or a convention, the limits of the exercise of the power will be set by the terms of that
treaty or convention, that is to say, the Commonwealth will be limited to making laws to perform
the obligations, or to secure the benefits which the treaty imposes or confers on Australia.
Whilst the choice of the legislative means by which the treaty or convention shall be implemented is for the legislative authority, it is for this Court to determine whether particular provisions, when challenged, are appropriate and adapted to that end. The Court will closely
scrutinize the challenged provisions to ensure that what is proposed to be done substantially
falls within the power.
113 C.L.R. at 86.
202.

See id.

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

The Tasmanian Dam Case, 46 Austl. L.R. at 674, 745-49, 849.
Id. at 770-72, 801-06.
Id. at 702-03.
Id. at 736.
The Weekend Australian, July 2-3, 1983, at 1.
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Premier Bjelke-Petersen of Queensland stated that the decision marked "the
end of Federation and shows the first crack in the Commonwealth." 20 8
Another Queensland politician was quoted as saying that "the rights of each
state are imperilled if the Commonwealth uses its UN treaties as a stick with
which to beat the states into submission." 20 9 A Queensland legal expert said
"the States are now virtually subject to the whim of Canberra, which can make
international agreements and bind itself to overrule the States." 2 10 One
newspaper editorial commented that "the judgment has created the most fundamental constitutional change since Federation, in a way that was probably
never envisaged by its founders." 2 1 1 Another editorial noted that "control
over the basic principles of Australia's system of government has been taken
out of the hands of the people and delivered to judges not answerable to any
electorate," and that the federal government's "legal victory has saved a river
but has sacrificed one of the safeguards of our democratic system." 2 12 A Liberal Party spokesman said that the decision would have such a "profound
effect on the division of powers between the Commonwealth and the States
2 13
• . . that the system as we have known it could virtually cease to exist."
D.

The External Affairs Power After the Tasmanian Dam Case

The decision in the Tasmanian Dam Case supports the broader view of the
external affairs power: Parliament can implement any treaty made by the
Commonwealth, no matter what its subject matter, provided it does not contravene a specific constitutional prohibition and is not a treaty artifically
entered into in order to usurp legislative power for the Commonwealth that
otherwise had not been given it. The decision rejects the narrow view that
some limitation must be placed on the Commonwealth's power to implement
treaties in order to maintain the careful balance between state and Commonwealth powers incorporated in the constitution. The dissenting view, that
Parliament's power is confined to implementing treaties truly international in
character, was also rejected.
Although the broad, expansive view of the section 51 (xxix) power prevails,
even some members of the Tasmanian Dam majority emphasized that the legislation in question must be clearly designed to implement the treaty. Whether
the test articulated by some, that the legislation be "reasonably appropriate"
to implementing the treaty or convention, is so broad as to impose virtually
no limit on legislation, remains to be seen. At least the High Court, in both
Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen2t 4 and the TasmanianDam Case, has upheld use of the
external affairs power to reach subjects normally reserved to the states by the
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
(Senator
214.

Id. at 8, col. 2.
Id. at 8, col. 3.
Id.at 1.
Id. at 10, cols. 1-2.
The Australian, July 7, 1983, at 1, cols. 2-3.
Statement of Senator Peter Durack, quoted in The Weekend Australian, July 2-3, 1983, at 1
Durack is the opposition's spokesman on attorney general matters.).
39 Austl. L.R. 417 (1982); see supra notes 125-60 and accompanying text.
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constitution and tradition. Admittedly, however, the vote in each case was
extremely close.
To what extent might future Commonwealth legislation on education be
authorized by the external affairs power, particularly with regard to unfunded
civil rights mandates like those of such U.S. statutes as Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,215 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,216 and
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973?217 Justice Wilson, in his dissenting opinion in Koowarta, expressed concern that the emerging "sophisticated network of international arrangements directed to the personal,
economic, social and cultural development of all human beings," would mean
that if section 51(xxix) were interpreted as vesting Parliament with power in
all of these areas, the effect "would be to transfer to the Commonwealth virtually unlimited power in almost every conceivable aspect of life in Australia,
including . . . education." 21 8 Justice Gibbs also was concerned that if section
51 (xxix) were interpreted to empower Parliament to make laws to carry into
effect within Australia "any treaty which the Governor-General may make,"
Parliament would, in effect, be empowered to make laws on any subject, thus
destroying the federal balance achieved by the constitution. 21 9 "[The executive] could, for example, by making an appropriate treaty, obtain for the Parliament powers to control education, to regulate the use of land, to fix the
conditions of trading and employment, to censor the press or to determine
the basis of criminal responsibility." 220 Thus, at least two of the dissenters
believed that the majority's opinion in Koowarta would give the Commonwealth power over education if it could be related to treaties, international
agreements, or covenants.
IV
THE EFFECTS OF A BROAD INTERPRETATION OF SECTIONS

AND

A.

96

51 (xxix)

ON THE COMMONWEALTH'S ROLE IN EDUCATION

International Agreements to Which Australia is a Party

One recent commentator has pointed out that education today clearly is an
international concern, and he notes that many international organizations of
which Australia is a member consider education to be an important objective
215.

42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1982).

216.

20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1982).

217. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). As previously noted, AUSTL. CONST. § 96 permits the Commonwealth to provide financial assistance to any State on such terms and conditions as the Parliament
thinks fit, and therefore might support a grant-in-aid statute for education with the kinds of conditions which are found, for example, in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975. See
infra text accompanying notes 336-40. In addition, section 51 (xxiiiA) gives Parliament the power "to
make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to . . .
[tihe provision of. . . benefits to students ......
This section thus provides authorization for financial aid directly to students. It might also authorize a much broader exercise of power in the area of
educational policy, although it has not been so interpreted to date.
218. Koowarta, 39 Austl. L.R. at 481.
219. Id. at 438.
220. Id. (emphasis added).
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for them or even their principal focus. 22 ' These organizations include the
United Nations Organization, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization, the International Labor Organization, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Moreover, Australia has
participated in educational programs through its membership in the Commonwealth Education Conference, the Colombo Plan, the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization, and the Asian and Pacific Council. He argues that conventions signed or agreements made on issues involving education by Australia as a member of these international organizations would attract the
operation of the external affairs power and thus permit the Commonwealth to
2 22
enact legislation dealing with education.
There are five major conventions or covenants which deal with education,
at least in part. The first is the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 22 3 This Convention was relied upon by
Parliament when it enacted the Racial Discrimination Act 1975,224 challenged
by the State of Queensland in Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen. 225 In that Convention, the States Parties undertake to prohibit all forms of discrimination wherever found. Article 5, in particular, provides in part:
States Parties undertake to prohibit and eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms
and to guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour or
national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of the
following rights:
(e) Economic, social and cultural rights, in particular:
(v) The right to education and training; ....

226

In article 6, the States Parties undertake to "assure . . . effective protection

22 7
and remedies" against any violations of the Convention.
The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 2 28 was adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly in December 1979. Article 10 of that Convention reads:

States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against

221.

Birch, Education and the External Affairs Power: Implications for the Governance of Australian

Schools, 27 AuSTL.J. EDUC. 234, 240-42 (1983). Following Koowarta v.Bjelke-Petersen, 39 Austl. L.R.
417 (1982), see supra notes 125-60 and accompanying text, other authors also suggested that the
Commonwealth could legislate in the field of human rights to implement international agreements,
and that such legislation could override any state or Commonwealth laws that were inconsistent with
human rights guarantees. See J. MCMILLAN, G. EVANS & H. STOREY, supra note 6, at 95.
222. Birch, supra note 221, at 240.
223. Supra note 127. The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on December 21, 1965. Australia signed the Convention on October 13, 1966 and ratified it
on September 30, 1975. The Convention entered into force January 4, 1969.
224. 1975 Austl. Acts 347.
225. 39 Austl. L.R. 417 (1982); see supra notes 125-60 and accompanying text.
226. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 127, art. 5.
227. Id. art. 6.
228. Openedfor signature March 1, 1980, G.A. Res. 180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/180. The Convention was signed by Australia on July 17, 1980, and entered
into force on September 3, 1981.
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women in order to ensure to them equal rights with men in the field of education and
in particular to ensure, on a basis of equality of men and women:
(a) The same conditions for career and vocational guidance, for access to studies
and for the achievement of diplomas in educational establishments of all categories... ;
(b) Access to the same curricula, the same examinations, teaching staff with qualifications of the same standard and school premises and equipment of the same
quality;
(c) The elimination of any stereotyped concept of the roles of men and women at
all levels and in all forms of education . . .in particular, by the revision of textbooks and school programmes and the adaptation of teaching methods . . .
(e) The same opportunities for access to programmes of continuing education . . .
(g) The same opportunities to participate actively in sports and physical education
229

In article 2, States Parties specifically undertake "to adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting
all discrimination against women ..
".."230
Finally, article 4 permits, but
does not require, States Parties to adopt affirmative action measures to
2 31
"accelerat[e] defacto equality between men and women."
23 2
The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
specifically notes that States Parties "recognize the right of everyone to education." 2 33 Article 2(2) notes that the States Parties undertake to guarantee that
the rights in the Covenant, including the right to education, "will be exercised
without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status." 234 In this Covenant, however, the obligations are not fully guaranteed immediately. Article 2(1) says that each State Party undertakes to take
steps "to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures." 2 35 One might call this the "all deliberate speed" provision.
There is also an international agreement that is concerned solely with education. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) adopted the Convention Against Discrimination in Education on
December 14, 1960.236 The preamble to the Convention notes that UNESCO
229. Id. art. 10.
230. Id. art. 2(b).
231. Id. art. 4(1).
232. Openedfor signature Dec. 19, 1966, Annex to G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N.GAOR Supp. (No.16)
at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (hereinafter cited as International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights). The Covenant was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on December 16, 1966;
signed by Australia on December 18, 1972, and ratified on December 10, 1975; and entered into
force on January 3, 1976.
233. Id. art. 13(1).
234. Id. art. 2(2).
235. Id. art. 2(1).
236. Annex I to U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/210 (1961) (hereinafter cited as Convention Against
Discrimination in Education). The Convention was ratified by Australia in August 1974 and entered
into force in November 1974.
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"has the duty not only to proscribe any form of discrimination in education
but also to promote equality of opportunity and treatment for all in education
...
,237 Article 1 of the Convention defines the term "discrimination" to
include:
any distinction, exclusion, limitation or preference which, being based on race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic
condition or birth, has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing equality of
treatment in education and in particular:
(a) Of depriving any person or group of persons of access to education of any type
or at any level;
(b) Of limiting any person or group of persons to education of an inferior
standard;
(c) Subject to the provisions of Article 2 of this Convention, of establishing or
maintaining separate educational systems or institutions for persons or groups

of persons; .... 238
The establishment or the maintenance of separate educational systems or
institutions on the basis of sex is permitted, however, "if these systems or
institutions offer equivalent access to education, provide a teaching staff of
qualifications of the same standard as well as school premises and equipment
of the same quality, and afford the opportunity to take the same or equivalent
239
courses of study."
Under this Convention, States Parties undertake to repeal statutory provisions or discontinue administrative practices that involve discrimination in
education and "to ensure, by legislation where necessary, that there is no discrimination in the admission of pupils to educational institutions. " 240 Furthermore, the States Parties undertake to "formulate, develop and apply a
national policy which. . . will tend to promote equality of opportunity and of
,,241
treatment in the matter of education ....
2 42
Finally, while the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

does not specifically deal with education, it purports to protect individual civil
and political rights, as well as economic, social and cultural rights. Article 26
of that Covenant provides:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimina-

tion and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination
political or other opinion,
on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
24 3
national or social origin, property, birth or other status.

237. Id. preamble.
238. Id. art. 1.
239. Id. art. 2(a). Article 2 also permits separate schools for "religious or linguistic reasons," as
long as attendance at such institutions is optional, id. art. 2(b), and the establishment or maintenance
of private educational institutions as long as the purpose "is not to secure the exclusion of any
group," id. art. 2(c).
240. Id. art. 3(a)-(b).
241. Id. art. 4.
242. Supra note 108. The Covenant was adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on Dec. 16, 1966; signed by Australia on December 18, 1972, and ratified on August 13,
1980; and entered into force on March 23, 1976. The latter date does not apply to article 41, which
entered into force on March 28, 1979.
243. Id. art 26.
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A State Party undertakes "to take the necessary steps, in accordance with
its constitutional processes. . . to adopt such legislative or other measures as
may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the . . . Covenant." 24 4 In addition, States Parties must provide effective remedies to any
2 45
person whose rights or freedoms recognized in the Covenant are violated.
The provisions of the Covenant apply to "all parts of federal states" as well as
to nations. 24 6 Australia signed the treaty with reservations,2 4 7 including one
which related to this last provision. The reservation indicated that implementation of the provisions of the Covenant which were the responsibility of the
federal authorities, as assigned by Australia's constitution, was to be a matter
for those authorities, but that implementation of those provisions of the Covenant over whose subject matter the states were assigned authority by the
constitution would be a matter for the states. 24 8 This reservation also applied
to the adoption of legislation to give effect to the rights recognized in the
24 9
Covenant.
The question of the significance of Australia's reservation to the Covenant
would appear to be mooted by the current state of section 51 (xxix) doctrine.
The effect of the reservation, if valid, was to leave implementation of the Covenant with respect to matters of state law to the states. The effect of Koowarta
v. Bjelke-Petersen250 and the Tasmanian Dam Case,2 5 1 however, is to make the
subject matter of any treaty to which Australia is a signatory a matter for Com244. Id. art. 2(2).
245. Id. art. 2(3).
246. Id. art. 50.
247. A reservation is "a unilateral statement, however phrased or named, made by a State, when
signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to a treaty, whereby it purports to exclude or

modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the treaty in their application to that State...

.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(l)(d), opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF. 39/27/Corr. 1, reprintedin 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 (1969); see Triggs, Australia's Ratification of
the InternationalCovenant on Civil and Political Rights: Endorsement or Repudiation?, 31 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
278, 280-84 (1982). A reservation to a multilateral treaty becomes effective when another state
accepts it. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra, art. 20(4)(a). Failure to object to a
reservation within twelve months of notification waives any rights to object to the legal effects it
creates. Id. art. 20(5). A reservation may be invalid per se, however, if it is found to be "incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty." Triggs, supra, at 283. There exist no reliable criteria
for resolving this question but authorities have isolated several factors which guide the inquiry. See
id. at 284 & nn.31-32.
248. The reservation specifically states:
Australia advises that, the people having united as one people in a Federal Commonwealth
under the Crown, it has a federal constitutional system. . . . It enters a general reservation that
article 2, paragraphs 2 and 3, and article 50 shall be given effect consistently with and subject to
the provisions in article 2, paragraph 2.
In particular, in relation to the Australian States the implementation of those provisions of
the Covenant over whose subject matter the federal authorities exercise legislative, executive
and judicial jurisdiction will be a matter for those authorities; and the implementation of those
provisions of the Covenant over whose subject matter the authorities of the constituent States
exercise legislative, executive and judicial jurisdiction will be a matter for those authorities; and
where a provision has both federal and State aspects, its implementation will accordingly be a
matter for the respective constitutionally appropriate authorities . ...
lultilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General 118, U.N. Doc. St/LEG/SER.EA (1982).
249. See supra text accompanying note 244.
250. 39 Austl. L.R. 417 (1982); see supra notes 125-60 and accompanying text.
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monwealth legislative power, even if the subject matter was otherwise constitutionally committed to the states.
B.

The Significance of These Agreements for Civil Rights Mandates

The question now to be explored is whether the foregoing covenants and
conventions, when coupled with the external affairs power of section 51 (xxix),
provide the Commonwealth with the authority to enact civil rights laws similar
in nature to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,252 Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,253 section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of

1973,254

and their implementing regulations.
The broad language of each of the convenants and conventions discussed
above, together with the expansive reading given to the section 51(xxix)
power by the majority in both Koowarta and the Tasmanian Dam Case, arguably
gives the Commonwealth authority to pass legislation similar to Title VI.
Article 5 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination 25 5 and article 2(2) of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2 56 would seem to provide such
authority. Even the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
although it does not specifically mention education, in providing for "equal
protection of the law" in article 26257 would seem to authorize legislation
comparable to Title VI.
The broad view of the external affairs power taken by the Koowarta and
Tasmanian Dam cases 2 58 - that the existence of an international agreement on
virtually any subject will support Commonwealth legislation implementing the
obligations of the agreement 25 9-would

permit legislation related to the

above-mentioned Conventions. The second question, whether legislation
patterned after Title VI would be congruent with the obligations of the international agreements, 260 also should be answered in the affirmative in view of
the majority position that laws and regulations need only be reasonably
related to accomplishing the obligation undertaken in the agreement. 26'
251. Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 46 Austl. L.R. 625 (1983); seesupra notes 161-213 and accompanying text.
252. "No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982); see also id.
§§ 2000d-l to 2000d-5.
253. "No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation
in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or
activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . . 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1982).
shall, solely by reason of his handicap,
254. "No otherwise qualified handicapped individual ...
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 223-26.
256. See supra text accompanying note 234.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 242-43.
258. See supra section III D.
259. See supra text accompanying notes 179-89.
260. See supra text accompanying note 117.
261. While two members of the majority in the Tasmanian Dam Case, Justices Deane and
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The "all deliberate speed" provision 26 2 in the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights permits the argument to be made that
equality of education is aspirational only, and thus not of sufficient international concern to permit Commonwealth legislation in an area committed to
the states. This kind of argument clearly failed in the Tasmanian Dam Case,
2 63
however.
One of the interesting questions is whether the terms "national or ethnic
origin" in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 2 64 and "language" and "national origin" in the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights,

26 5

266
the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,

and the Convention Against Discrimination in Education 26 7 would be interpreted in the same manner as the term "national origin" in Title V12 68 has
been interpreted. The U.S. Department of Education, following policy originally established by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW), has interpreted this language to require affirmative assistance to children with limited English proficiency. 2 69 This interpretation was upheld by
the Supreme Court in Lau v. Nichols. 2 70 At one point, the Department of Education went so far as to promulgate regulations that interpreted affirmative
assistance to require, in certain circumstances, the provision of bilingual education. 271 Failure to do so would be a violation of Title VI.272 Similar interpretation in Australia of the relevant provisions of these conventions and
covenants could permit the Commonwealth to view failure on the part of
school authorities to provide affirmative assistance (including bilingual education) to language minority children as discrimination on the basis of "language," "ethnic origin," or "national origin."
Looking at the language of the Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, it is not unlikely that a majority of
Brennan, would require some degree of closeness of fit between the obligation and the imple-

menting legislation, 46 Austl. L.R. at 770-72, 801-06; see supra text accompanying notes 202-04, Title
VI-type legislation would clearly pass the test. Justices Murphy and Mason would require only that
the legislation be "reasonably appropriate." 46 Austl. L.R. at 702-03, 736; see supra text accompanying notes 205-06.
262. See supra text accompanying note 235.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 191-99.
264. International Convention on The Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, supra
note 127, art. 1(1).
265. United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 108, art.
2(1).
266. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 232, art. 2(2).
267. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, supra note 236, art. 1.
268. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1982).
269. See 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595 (1970).
270. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
271. Proposed Rules (Nondiscrimination Under Programs Receiving Federal Assistance
Through the Department of Education), 45 Fed. Reg. 52,052, 52,055-59 (1980) (proposed Aug. 5,
1980).
272. Id. The regulations did not become final, however. See Levin, An Analysis of the Federal
Attempt to Regulate Bilingual Education: ProtectingCivil Rights or Controlling Curriculum?, 12 J.L. & EDuc.

29 (1983).
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the High Court would also find legislation similar to Title IX 2 73 to be congruent with the obligation undertaken by Australia as one of the States Parties. This conclusion would apply as well to the other three conventions and
274
covenants which bar discrimination on the basis of sex.
Article 10(c) of the Convention, 2 75 promoting elimination of gender stereotypes through revision of textbooks and teaching methods, raises an interesting question. In drafting regulations to implement Title IX, HEW took the
position that it would exclude textbooks and curricular content from the
scope of administrative purview, 2 76 out of concern that federal intervention in
such matters "would thrust the Department into the role of Federal censor"
and might possibly violate the first amendment. 27 7 Since Australia does not
have a constitutional equivalent to the U.S. Constitution's first amendment,
there might be no equivalent difficulty for the Commonwealth in introducing
a legislative or regulatory provision dealing with the subject matter of article
10(c) of the Convention.
The real question is whether legislation similar to section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act could be enacted in Australia under any of these covenants or
conventions. Would either the term "birth" or the term "other status" be
considered broad enough to include the handicapped as a protected group?
Nowhere else in the covenants and conventions are the handicapped specifically mentioned. In both the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, discrimination on the
ground of "birth or other status" is prohibited. 278 The Convention Against
Discrimination in Education prohibits discrimination on the ground of
"birth. ' 279 However, the term "other status" is not included in that Convention, and it is by no means evident that discrimination against the hand280
icapped was meant to be included.
273. Title IX has some of the same exceptions as the Convention: in regard to admissions,
elementary and secondary schools, whether public or private, are exempt as are private institutions
of undergraduate higher education and public institutions of undergraduate higher education that
have traditionally been single-sex; military institutions are exempt; and religious institutions are
exempt if Title IX would be inconsistent with their religious tenets. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982).
274. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 232; Convention Against Discrimination in Education, supra note 236; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 108.
275. See supra text accompanying note 228.
276. 34 C.F.R. § 106.42 (1984).
277. 40 Fed. Reg. 24,135 (1975).
278. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 108, art. 2(1); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 232, art. 2(2).
279. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, supra note 236, art. 1.
280. There are several U.N. General Assembly declarations which touch on issues of educational opportunity for the handicapped. One is the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res.
1386, 14 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 19, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (1959). Principle 5 of the Declaration
states that "[tihe child who is physically, mentally or socially handicapped shall be given the special
• . . education . . . required by his particular condition." The second is the Declaration on the
Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, G.A. Res. 2856, 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 29) at 93, U.N.
Doc. A/8588 (1971). It "calls for national and international action" to ensure that the Declaration will
be a "frame of reference" for the protection of several listed rights, including "a right ... to such
education, training, rehabilitation and guidance as will enable him to develop his ability and maximum potential." The third is the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons, G.A. Res. 3447, 30
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The remaining issue for a Commonwealth Parliament wishing to enact
civil rights mandates in education under its section 51(xxix) power is that of
enforcement. In the United States, Title VI, Title IX, and section 504 are all
enforced by the termination of federal funds going to any "program or
activity" in which discrimination occurs. The phrase "program or activity"
has recently been given a narrow interpretation by the U.S. Supreme
Court. 28 '

An expansive interpretation in Australia could have an over-

whelming impact, particularly if not only the specific purpose grants but also
the revenue sharing or tax reimbursement grants are considered to be federal
or Commonwealth funds which can be cut off if discrimination occurs.
C.

Section 96 Authority

As noted above, the international covenants and conventions discussed in
this section do not provide clear and convincing support for equal educational
opportunity for the handicapped. Thus a statute similar to U.S. section 504
might not be found to be within the Commonwealth's section 51 (xxix) power.
Similarly, it is not clear that an affirmative duty to provide special assistance to
the economically disadvantaged could be based on any of the agreements,
although the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on EcoCultural Rights prohibit discrimination on the basis of
nomic, Social and
"social origin," 28 2 and the Convention Against Discrimination in Education
prohibits discrimination on the basis of "social origin" and "economic condition." 28 3 Nevertheless, grant-in-aid statutes could contain conditions, similar

to those found in the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 2 84 and in
Title I (now Chapter 1) of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965,285 designed to ensure benefits to the economically disadvantaged.
The authority, in other words, need not lie in international conventions or
covenants, coupled with the exercise of section 51(xxix) power, but in a
broader application of section 96 than has hitherto been followed. The question here would be whether section 96 could be read that expansively. The
role that section 96 power played in enabling the Commonwealth to introduce
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 88, U.N. Doc. A/10284/Add.l (1975). It is similar to the Declaration
on the Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, and includes "the right to . . . education, vocational
training and rehabilitation, aid, counseling. . . and other services which will enable them to develop
their capabilities and skills to the maximum and will hasten the process of their social integration or
reintegration." Such Declarations do not ordinarily carry the same weight as international treaties or
agreements. As discussed above, see supra text accompanying notes 140-41, only two High Court
Justices, Murphy and Mason, might find that the existence of a treaty is not a necessary prerequisite
to the exercise of the section 51 (xxix) power. For them, it is sufficient that the legislation relate to a

matter of international "concern" or to "observance in Australia of international standards of human
rights," Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen, 39 Austl. L.R. 417, 473 (1982) (Murphy, J.), even if there is no
international agreement.
281. Grove City College v. Bell, 104 S. Ct. 1211 (1984).
282. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 108, art. 2(1); International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 232, art. 2(2).
283. Convention Against Discrimination in Education, supra note 236, art. 1.
284. 20 U.S.C. § 1412 (1982).
285. 20 U.S.C. § 236 (1982).
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and carry out the Uniform Tax Scheme has already been outlined. 28 6
Although the section 81 power to appropriate money for "the purposes of the
Commonwealth" has been used from time to time, it has not been a broadly
used power and so the primary vehicle for the distribution of federal funds
has been, and continues to be, section 96.287
As has been previously pointed out, section 96 grants can be made without
any conditions at all. These are the general revenue grants made under the
tax reimbursement or financial assistance grants programs in accordance with
the 1942 Uniform Tax Scheme. The only "condition" presently imposed on
these programs is that the States refrain from imposing their own income
taxes. There are also specific purpose grants, which are made with specific
conditions attached. Conditional grants are made in areas where the Commonwealth does not normally have legislative power, as illustrated by the
States Grants (Schools) Act. 288 Most commentators believe that section 96
can be construed to permit the Commonwealth to grant financial assistance to
28 9
any state on such terms and conditions as it sees fit.
In 1926, the High Court was presented with a case challenging the constitutionality of the Federal Aid Roads Act of 1926.290 This was "It]he first specific purpose grant enacted in Australia for a purpose not within the
Commonwealth legislative power." 2'9 Under this Act, the Commonwealth
was to enter into agreements with the various states, and provide funds to the
states, based on these agreements, to enable them to construct and maintain
roads. It was argued on behalf of the States of Victoria and South Australia
that the law was invalid because it was a law relating to roadmaking rather
than a law for granting financial aid to the states. Thus, it was not authorized
under either section 96 or section 51 of the constitution. The States argued
that, under section 96, Parliament could not attach as conditions to its grant
any conditions which were, in effect, the exercise of legislative power not
within section 51. In this case, since the principal purpose of the Act was road
construction, it was not authorized by section 96. Indeed, the plaintiffs went
so far as to argue that section 96 applied only to loans for temporary purposes
and that grant conditions could only be those of a kind customarily imposed
to secure repayment of such loans.
The High Court, in what must be one of its briefest opinions, said simply
that the Federal Aid Roads Act was a valid enactment, "plainly warranted by
the provisions of Section 96 of the Constitution," and proceeded to dimiss the
action. 292
286. See supra text accompanying notes 54-56.
287. SeeJ. MCMILLAN, G.EVANS & H. STOREY, supra note 6, at 84, 117.
288. 1973 Austi. Acts 1407; see supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
289. See, e.g., J. MCMILLAN, G. EVANS & H. STOREY, supra note 6, at 120.
290. Victoria v. Commonwealth (The Federal Roads Case), 38 C.L.R. 399 (Austl. 1926) (per
curiam).
291.
(1978).
292.

Saunders, The Development of the Commonwealth Spending Power, 11MELB. U.L. REV. 369, 386
The Federal Roads Case, 38 C.L.R. at 406.

Page 213: Spring 1985]

AUSTRALIA

Section 81 of the Australian Constitution authorizes the legislature to
appropriate funds for "the purposes of the Commonwealth," and it is generally accepted that this power extends to the making of grants to the States.
There is still some doubt whether the phrase "purposes of the Commonwealth" is limited to those matters over which the Commonwealth Parliament
has legislative or executive power under the constitution (primarily those
powers given to it in section 51).293 Limitations on the scope of the appropriations power, however, have not acted as a constraint on grants to the states,
inasmuch as the Commonwealth Parliament can use the grants power in section 96. The section 96 power has been interpreted, however, as requiring
that the grants be made through the state governments rather than directly by
29 4
the Commonwealth.
It was not until the Labor Party gained power in 1972 that resort to conditional grants under section 96 of the constitution was extensively used to
implement policies in areas that went beyond the legislative powers given to
the Commonwealth by the constitution. Prime Minister Whitlam said that the
Commonwealth would be expected
to be involved in the planning of the function in which we are financially involved. We
believe that it would be irresponsible for the national Government to content itself
with simply providing funds without being involved in the process by which priorities
29 5

are met, and by which expenditures are planned and by which standards are met.

Expansion through the use of the section 96 power into many areas,
including education, was slowed by the change of government following the
December 1975 elections. The Liberal-Country Party indicated that it would
end the specific purpose grants under section 96 and transfer the funds now
going to such programs to general purpose revenue reimbursement. In a
comment reminiscent of those of the present U.S. administration (and also
the Nixon administration), Prime Minister Fraser, shortly after the elections,
said:
[T]here are some programs . . . which represent areas of expenditure which clearly
deserve continuing Commonwealth support but in which there is no obvious need that
my Government can see for the Commonwealth to be involved in a specific way.
There are matters in respect of which priorities should appropriately be left to the
States and their authorities to determine.
In such cases, some form of absorption of specific purpose funds into general pur-

2 96
pose funds would be appropriate.

Despite such rhetoric, the number of specific purpose grants did not significantly diminish after the 1975 elections. Certainly grants for education
29 7
continued and were even expanded to cover additional specific purposes.
293. Else-Mitchell, The Australia Federal Grants System and Its Impact on Fiscal Relations of the Federal
Government with State and Local Government, 54 AUSTL. LJ. 480, 481 (1980).

294. Id.
295. Id. at 484.
296. Id. at 485.
297. For examples of specific purpose grants under the States Grants (Schools) Act 1973, 1973
Austl. Acts 1407, see supra text accompanying notes 96-98.
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The FederalRoads Case298 and subsequent statutes enacted by both political
parties indicate that specific purpose grants can be enacted in Australia for
purposes not otherwise within the legislative power of the Commonwealth
under the authority of section 96. The question, then, is whether anything in
section 96 or elsewhere limits the extent or nature of the conditions the Com29 9
monwealth may attach to such grants.
In upholding the validity of the Federal Aid Roads Act 1926, the High
Court rejected the argument that the terms and conditions attached to a grant
pursuant to section 96 must be restricted to financial terms and conditions
"analogous to the terms and conditions of a mortgage, which are imposed to
secure repayment of the loan." 30 0 The conditions attached to the grants in
that statute were clearly regulatory conditions, specifying, among other
things, the types of roads to be built, details of construction, and standards for
future road maintenance. The grants were also conditioned on the states'
providing matching sums.
The scope of section 96 was further clarified by Deputy Federal Commissioner
of Taxation v. W R. Moran Proprietary, Ltd. 3 0 1 which indicated that section 96
power is not necessarily restricted by other provisions of the constitution.
Chief Justice Latham noted in that case that "the remedy for any abuse of the
power conferred by Section 96 is political and not legal in character." 30 2 In
light of these cases, as well as the Uniform Tax Cases,3 0 3 the broad extent of
section 96 power seemed to be a settled matter.
Theoretically, it would seem that the Commonwealth Parliament has the
same extensive power to condition grants under section 96 as the U.S. courts
have held Congress to have under article I, section 8, clause 1 of the U.S.
Constitution. 30 4 As we have already seen, however, the conditions actually
imposed on specific purpose grants, in the States Grants (Schools) Act 1973
and subsequent annual appropriations acts, have been almost non-existent
30 5
compared to those attached to U.S. grant-in-aid statutes.
298. Victoria v. Commonwealth, 38 C.L.R. 399 (Austl. 1926); see supra text accompanying notes
290-92.
299. See supra note 72, indicating that there are no significant limits on the nature and extent of
the conditions that can be imposed on grants-in-aid statutes enacted under U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.

1.
300. The Federal Roads Case, 38 C.L.R. at 405. The argument was made on behalf of the state
of South Australia. Id.
301. 61 C.L.R. 735 (Austl. 1939).
302. Id. at 764.
303. South Australia v. Commonwealth (First Uniform Tax Case), 65 C.L.R. 373 (Austl. 1942);
Victoria v. Commonwealth (Second Uniform Tax Case), 99 C.L.R. 575 (Austl. 1957). See supra note
56.
One recent commentator has noted that, in view of this series of cases, "[ilt is now settled that the
nature and extent of the conditions attached to grants depend solely on political rather than legal
considerations. In the case of specific purpose grants the most relevant political consideration is the
philosophy of the current federal government." Saunders, supra note 291, at 395.
304. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
305. See supra text accompanying note 98.
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V
AUSTRALIA'S CURRENT EDUCATIONAL GRANT PROGRAMS UNDER

SECTION

A.

96

Language Minority Programs

The principal grant-in-aid program for language minority children in the
United States is the Bilingual Education Act,3 0 6 passed in 1968 as part of the
amendments to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. Under the
original statute, a limited amount of funding was made available to school
districts which submitted proposals. Among the programs to be funded were
"bilingual education programs" and "programs designed to impart to students a knowledge of the history and culture associated with their
languages."307
In 1974, Congress amended the Act,3 0 8 noting that the purpose was "to

encourage the establishment and operation, where appropriate, of educational programs using bilingual educational practices, techniques, and
methods."3 0 9 Bilingual education was defined as the giving of instruction in
English "and to the extent necessary to allow a child to progress effectively
through the educational system, the native language of the children of limited
English-speaking ability. '3 10 The Bilingual Education Act provides fiscal
incentives to school districts committed to assisting children with limited English proficiency, in contrast to the federal government's interpretation of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964311 as imposing an affirmative duty on school
officials to provide special assistance to such children. Title VI, of course,
does not provide any fiscal assistance, and the sanction for non-compliance
with Title VI is the cutoff of all federal funds received by the school district.
Despite the discretionary nature of programs funded under the Bilingual
Education Act, there are a number of conditions that clearly control what the
schools may do if they receive the funds. For example, "to prevent the segregation of children on the basis of national origin" in programs supported
under the Bilingual Education Act, "and in order to broaden the understanding of children about languages and cultural heritages other than their
own, a program of bilingual instruction may include the participation of children whose language is English, but in no event shall the percentage of such
children exceed 40 percent." 31 2 Moreover, in such courses as art, music, and
physical education, children with limited proficiency in English must participate in regular classes rather than in separate classes. 31 3 There are other con306. Bilingual Education Act, Pub. L. No. 90-247, §§ 701-706, 81 Stat. 783, 816-21 (1968)
(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3381-3382, 3384 (1982)).
307. Id. § 704(c)(1)-(2), 81 Stat. at 817 (repealed 1972).
308. Bilingual Education Act, Pub. L. No. 93-380, tit. I, § 105(a)(1)-(b), 88 Stat. 484, 503-12
(1974) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 3221-3261 (1982)).
309. Id. § 702(a)(A), 88 Stat. at 503 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 3222(a)).
310. Id. § 703(4)(i), 88 Stat. at 504-05 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 3223(a)(4)(A)(i)).
311. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1982).
312. 20 U.S.C. § 3223(a)(4)(B) (1982).
313. Id. § 3223(a)(4)(C).
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ditions governing application for funds for a program of bilingual education,
including limitations on what the funds can be used for and who may apply for
the funds, a requirement that the proposal be developed in consultation with
an advisory council of stipulated composition, and other criteria governing
approval of the application. 3 14 There are also detailed fiscal criteria to ensure
that federal funds "supplement the level of State and local funds that, in the
absence of those Federal funds, would have been expended for special programs for children of limited English proficiency and in no case to supplant
such State and local funds." 3 1 5 The regulations promulgated to implement
this statute occupy fifty-nine pages in the Code of Federal Regulations.
As recently as 1978, nothing much had been done at the federal level in
Australia either in English as a Second Language or in multicultural curricula.
In 1978, a commission was established which then made recommendations to
the Commonwealth government. As a result of these recommendations, the
Schools Commission was authorized to make grants to the states for programs
in these areas.
1. ESL Programs. In Australia, there are few conditions attached to funds
for language minority children, and most of these are related to fiscal
accounting. Grants for the English-as-a-Second-Language (ESL) Program
had two elements in 1983. The larger share of funds was allocated for general
support to government and nongovernment schools to provide services
directed "at improving the English language competence of students from
non-English-speaking backgrounds." 3 16 The States Grants (Schools Assistance) Act 1982317 requires only that the state ensure that the money be spent
for that general purpose, that it submit a statement to the Commonwealth
summarizing how the money was spent, and that it furnish the Commonwealth with a private accountant's certification that the funds have been spent
as intended.3 1 8 There are no enforceable regulations implementing the
statute. There are guidelines, but these merely suggest how the funds might
be used:
*

the employment of specialist teachers, including bilingual teachers, to teach

English as a second language, and their use in a variety of situations, including,
but not restricted to intensive and part-time withdrawal situations, and assistance
to regular teachers to enable them to attend more adequately to English language

*
"

development across the curriculum for second language learners;
the employment of advisory staff, interpreters, translators, bilingual welfare
officers, teacher aides and school-community liaison workers; and3 19
curriculum development and the provision of learning materials.

314. See id. §§ 3223(a)(4)(E), 3231.
315. Id. § 3231(b)(3)(G).
316. COMMONWEALTH SCHOOLS COMMISSION, PROGRAM GUIDELINES 1983, at 39 (1983) [hereinafter cited as GUIDELINES]. The total amount available was $55,377,000, with $16,463,000 of that
amount going to nongovernment (including sectarian) schools. Id. at 41. (The amounts are given in
Australian dollars.)
317. 1982 Austl. Acts 1745.
318. See id. § 17, 1982 Austl. Acts at 1765.
319. GUIDELINES, supra note 316, § 6.5, at 39-40.
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The remaining ESL funds are to be used for "intensive English language
programs for non-English-speaking students who are newly arrived in Australia." 320 An "eligible new arrival" is defined in the statute as a person from
a country other than Australia whose first language is a language other than
English and who arrived in Australia the previous year.3 2' The intensive
instruction is separate from the regular education program and is designed to
prepare children for entry into primary or secondary education at either a
government or nongovernment school. 32 2 The guidelines again suggest the
variety of purposes for which funds might be used and state that a per capita
grant of $833323 will be made for each eligible student enrolled in a program
of intensive English language instruction.324
In the State of Western Australia, the ESL program consists of the newarrivals program for immigrants or refugees and a different ESL program in
the regular schools. 32 5 Every 3 months, the Department of Education for the
State of Western Australia notifies the Commonwealth how many new arrivals
they have who will be attending an Australian school for the first time. The
$833 per child received from the Commonwealth is the only funding for the
ESL program. A child may spend from 3 to 6 months in the program before
being placed in a regular school. For the newly arrived non-English speaker,
there are four intensive centers in the State-two primary school and two secondary school age programs-located near where the immigrants enter the
country or where they are likely to settle first. In the more rural areas, there
are not enough such children to warrant a center. Thus immigrant children
who come into the oil-producing, mining, or agricultural areas enter a regular
school and are given only "withdrawal" assistance, consisting of ESL instruction away from the regular classroom for 30 minutes a day, 5 days a week. If
there are fewer than six or eight such children in a school, the State provides
only an advisory teacher from the capital, who visits the school from time to
time to consult with regular teachers.
The intensive centers provide programs in three stages: (1) an intensive
program in survival English-basic language skills children might need "on
the street"; (2) a transition program in which they begin to learn the language
of subjects they will be studying in school; and (3) a "withdrawal program"
providing supplementary help to those who have recently entered the public
3 26
schools.
The teachers in the intensive centers are drawn from the best ESL teachers
320.
321.

Id. § 6.3, at 39.
States Grants (Schools Assistance) Act 1982, § 3(1), 1982 Austl. Acts 1745, 1751;

GuIDE-

LINES, supra note 316, §§ 6.17-6.20, at 42-43.

322. States Grants (Schools Assistance) Act 1982, § 12(2)(b), 1982 Austl. Acts 1745, 1762.
323. All monetary figures are given in Australian dollars.
324. Compare with the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1522(d) (1982), authorizing
English language instruction in the schools for refugee children.
325. Interview with Dr. Harry Pearson, Director of Child Migrant Education and Multicultural
Education, Department of Education, Western Australia (July 12, 1983) (memorandum on file with
author).
326. Id.
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in the regular schools.3 27 There is, however, very little training for teachers of
English as a Second Language, at least in Western Australia. What training
there is consists of a short program of in-service training: 5 days in intensive
3 28
study and then 5 additional Fridays.
In New South Wales, there is pressure for bilingual education that could
be termed language maintenance rather than transitional education. The
major ethnic organizations pushing for a community languages program provided by the school system include Greek, Italian, Turkish, Arabic, and Yugoslav organizations. 32 9 The Labor Party, which has only recently been elected
to office, has apparently made promises that it would provide bilingual education where there were concentrations of ethnic groups. As a result, some
recent observers have predicted that the issue of bilingual education will
become a much more significant issue in Australia as the Labor Party attempts
330
to deliver on its promise.
2. Ethnic Schools Program. Funds for ethnic education programs under the
statute are to be spent on joint government and nongovernment school programs administered by a nongovernmental authority. The ethnic education
grants require only that the state ensure that the funds received for ethnic
education will be paid to a nongovernmental school authority, that the nongovernmental school authority furnish the Commonwealth with a private
accountant's certification that funds have been applied as intended, and, as is
generally the case when monies are to be administered by a nongovernment
school authority, that there be a formal agreement between the state and the
nongovernment school authority.
The Commonwealth Minister of Education must designate a body as an
approved ethnic schools authority before it can receive funds from the Commonwealth. Funds are approved only if it is shown that the program will be
open to all, regardless of ethnic origin, and that no other financial assistance
will be provided by the Commonwealth toward the program. The Guidelines
state that the program is to "help maintain the languages of people from nonEnglish-speaking backgrounds."-3 3 1 Ethnic schools authorities are eligible for
assistance under the Guidelines, if their programs are:
*

designed to teach a community language (which may or may not be accompanied

by cultural instruction) and where religious instruction does not form a predominant part of the program;
*
*

open to students from any ethnic background . ..
and not supported by other financial assistance provided by the Commonwealth
towards any recurrent expenditure.

327.

Id.

328.

Id.

329. Interview with Dr. Douglas Swan, Director-General, and staff members, Department of
Education, New South Wales (July 22, 1983) (memorandum on file with author). Dr. Swan noted
that he was stressing "organizations," not parents.
330. Interview with members of the Commonwealth Schools Commission (July 8, 1983) (memorandum on file with author).
331. GUIDELINES, supra note 316, at 47.
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Funding will not be available to ethnic schools which are regarded as serving
33 2
political instruction purposes.
In the State of Western Australia, ethnic schools meet after school or on
Saturday mornings in government school buildings. The Commonwealth
provides $30 per child per year for a 2-hour language and culture program.
The particular ethnic community involved provides the teachers. Children
who go to the ethnic schools also attend the regular schools during the regular school day.
3.

Multicultural Programs. Multicultural education is defined as:
education. . . that is provided for students attending government or non-government
schools and that is designed to take account of the culture of peoples of the Aboriginal
race of Australia or of peoples who have migrated to Australia, including . . . education that is provided by way of instruction
in languages (other than the English lan3 33
guage) spoken by those peoples.

The Commonwealth Schools Commission funds the multicultural program
in its entirety. Funds may be spent on a variety of activities, excluding the
teaching of English as a Second Language. 33 4 The eastern states purportedly
have better programs of multicultural education because of the larger proportion of immigrants. The nature and quality of the programs vary considerably
from state to state as there are no conditions, other than fiscal reporting,
attached to the federal funding. The Western Australia Department of Education staff members assigned to develop these programs feel they are struggling in an environment in which the programs are not deemed very
important. There are limited resources and limited support. Multicultural
education also tends to be limited to European cultures; Asian and Aboriginal
cultures are generally excluded. In parts of Western Australia distant from
Perth, there is even less interest in multicultural education. Several school
officials have indicated that the money is used in non-productive ways.
Teachers are not really interested in taking on yet another program. Moreover, no great pressure for change appears to be coming from parent or com3 35
munity groups.
It is apparent from the foregoing that, perhaps because there are no particular requirements imposed by the federal government as a condition for
receipt of grants, the extent of programs for language minority children may
be greater in some states than in others.
332. Id. at 48. Funds can only be used for "educational purposes of a recurrent nature" and noi
for capital expenses, although use of federal funds for the rental of premises is permitted. Id. at 49
333. States Grants (Schools Assistance) Act 1982, § 3(1), 1982 Austl. Acts 1745, 1752.
334. GUIDELINES, supra note 316, at 44.
335. Interviews with Dr. Harry Pearson, Director of Child Migrant Education and Multicultura
Education, Department of Education, Western Australia (July 12, 1983); with staff members, Mul
ticultural Affairs, Department of Education, Western Australia (June 29, 1983); and with Willian
McKenzie, Educational Officer, Goldfield Region District, Kalgoorlie, Western Australia (July 15
1983) (memoranda on file with author).
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Programs for the Handicapped

As is well known, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,336 with its
comprehensive set of regulations, imposes upon school authorities in the
United States stringent requirements regarding educational opportunities for
the handicapped. In addition, the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act (EAHCA) 3 3 7 is an extremely prescriptive grant-in-aid statute; many of the
conditions look to the provision of procedural safeguards rather than substantive requirements. Under the EAHCA, a handicapped child is entitled to a
"free appropriate public education" which includes those "related services"
necessary to enable the handicapped child to benefit from special education. 338 States and school districts are required to identify and locate all
unserved handicapped children. 33 9 Special education and related services are
to be provided in accordance with an individualized education program
(IEP).340

An "appropriate" education is one that takes place in the least restrictive
educational setting. 3 41 If the regular educational setting is inappropriate for
academic subjects, handicapped students must at least participate with nonhandicapped students in nonacademic and extracurricular activities. Congress has thus mandated "mainstreaming" or "integration" (the term more
frequently used in Australia) of the handicapped. The burden is put on the
educational system to show that the child could not be educated satisfactorily
in a regular classroom; that is, Congress has imposed an affirmative duty on
state and local authorities to provide special aids, services and other resources
to enable handicapped children to overcome the barriers to an equal educational opportunity imposed by their handicap. There are also extensive procedural requirements and safeguards for handicapped children and their
parents. 34 2 To meet the requirements of the federal statute, states and school
districts must make substantial expenditures from their own resources, as the
federal funds do not begin to cover the needs of the handicapped.
By contrast, the federal program for the handicapped in Australia is quite
limited. For school-age children, special education is defined in the States
Grants (Schools Assistance) Act 1982 as "education under special programs
designed specifically for handicapped children that is provided in classes conducted at schools, or in classes conducted at centres other than schools
. ...4 Financial aid is provided to the states "for the purpose of meeting
recurrent expenditures . . . in connection with special education provided at
336. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
337. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982).
338. Id. §§ 1400(c), 1401(17).
339. Id. § 1414(a)(1)(A).
340. Id. § 1414(a)(5).
341. "A recipient shall place a handicapped person in the regular educational environment. ..
unless it is demonstrated by the recipient that the education of the person in the regular environment
with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily." 34 C.F.R.
§ 104.34(a) (1984).
342. 20 U.S.C. § 1415 (1982).
343. States Grants (Schools Assistance) Act 1982, § 3(1), 1982 Austl. Acts 1745, 1755.
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or in connection with government schools or government centres in the
State. 13 4 4 Funds also go to nongovernment schools for expenditures in con-

45
nection with special education.3

The states must ensure that the amount of the grant they receive is spent
for this purpose, and that a portion of the grant is "applied in connection with
integration activities conducted at government schools in the State or places
of education approved by the Minister .
346 For example, in the 1982
Act, Western Australia received $103,000 for "government integration activities" out of a total of $1,876,000 for special education. 34 7 "Integration activities" are defined as: "activities the purpose of which is to integrate
handicapped children into schools, or other places of education approved by
"...

the Minister .

.

..

at which education is provided for children other than

handicapped children ....
"348 Fiscal reporting requirements include certification by an authorized person that the funds have been spent for the designated purpose and a statement indicating for what the money was spent. 349

In Australia, there are no extensive conditions attached to the receipt of
funds for special education comparable to those in the EAHCA. "Integration" is not prescribed as "mainstreaming" is in the United States. Nor are
there the other kinds of requirements seen in the EAHCA, such as the
requirement to provide supplementary aids or services for the integrated
handicapped students. 350 In some areas in the State of Western Australia, for
example, there are special education classes only for the primary grades.
Therefore, once students complete the primary grades, they are "integrated"
into the regular classes in the secondary school without any supplementary
351
aids or services.
The Schools Commission's Guidelines for special education grants provide: "[F]unds are allocated according to priorities determined by the States
in meeting the special needs of handicapped children. These needs will vary
from school to school according to the type of handicap being catered for."-3 52
With regard to integration of the handicapped, in contrast to the stringent
requirements of the EAHCA, the Guidelines note that "there are differences
in the extent to which integration has been achieved and . . . variations in

State and Territory policies concerning the ways in which it should be undertaken." 35 3 The Guidelines also give examples of the use to which integration
344. Id. § 15(2), 1982 Austl. Acts at 1763.
345. Id. § 32(2), 1982 Austl. Acts at 1782.
346. Id. § 15(2), 1982 Austl. Acts at 1763.
347. Id. sched. 4, 1982 Austl. Acts at 1800.
348. Id. § 3(1), 1982 Austl. Acts at 1752.
349. Id. § 17, 1982 Austi. Acts at 1765.
350. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(i)(C)(iv) (1982).
351. Interview with Derrick Tomlinson, Director of the National Centre for Research on Rural
Education, University of Western Australia (June 28, 1983) (memorandum on file with author).
352. GUIDELINES, supra note 316, at 22.
353. Id. at 26. The Commission, however, recommends that funds be applied in accordance with
the following priorities:
-The
movement of handicapped children from special to regular schools;
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funds may be put, which include in-service training of teachers, equipment,
development of curricular materials, speech therapy, excursions, teacher salaries, transportation, and minor building projects such as installation of hand3 54
rails and ramps and widening of doorways.
Some of the members of the Commonwealth Schools Commission have
expressed concern about what is happening to the funds for the handicapped
because there are no meaningful conditions and no mechanism for enforcement of the Guidelines. Many schools use the money to buy equipment, but
there is a dearth of programs, particularly programs for the mentally handicapped. It has also been suggested that, because of the strong teachers' union
in Australia, pressures for integration of the handicapped might lead to
teacher demands for smaller class sizes. Consequently, the issue of integra355
tion has received little attention.
Although requirements at the federal level are limited, a number of the
states have legislation for the handicapped. Under Western Australia's
statute, if the parents disagree with the placement of the child, an assessment
panel can be convened. The panel makes recommendations to the Minister,
and once the Minister has issued a "direction," the burden shifts to the parent
to show that the Minister's direction is incorrect. If the parents do not agree
with the "Minister's direction," they have 30 days within which to go to the
children's court.3 5 6 The state's guideline with regard to integration is "the
3' 5 7
maximum useful association in the best interests of all children.
The Commonwealth Schools Commission's funds are primarily spent for
salaries and special equipment in Western Australia. 35 8 There is no requirement at either the state or the Commonwealth level that the school system
3 59
identify unserved and underserved handicapped children.
In one region of Western Australia outside of the capital city area,3 60 even
fewer services are provided to the handicapped than in Perth. The decision

whether to place a child in a special class within a regular school rather than in
a special school is made by the educational psychologist for the district, often
-

the provision of services to enable isolated handicapped children to attend neighborhood
schools;
-facilitating
enrollment into regular primary schools of handicapped children who are beginning their formal schooling;
-the funding of activities to assist in the education of handicapped children already fully or
partially integrated into regular schools; and
-facilitating
enrollment into regular pre-schools of handicapped children below school age.
Id. at 26-27.
354. Id. at 27-28.
355. Interview with members of the Commonwealth Schools Commission (July 8, 1983) (memorandum on file with author).
356. Interview with Dr. Robert Weiland, Superintendent for Special Education, Department of
Education, Western Australia (July 12, 1983) (memorandum on file with author).
357. Compare this with the EAHCA's requirement of the "least restrictive environment." 20
U.S.C. § 1418(f(2)(E) (1982).
358. Interview with Dr. Robert Weiland, supra note 356.
359. Id. Compare this with 20 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(1)(A) (1982). See supra text accompanying note
339.
360. Kalgoorlie, Western Australia is a mining town of about 20,000.
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based on whether the child can follow instructions, sit still at a desk, and so
forth. In other words, children are sent by the educational psychologist Zo a
special education class in the regular school if they have "appropriate adaptive behavior." There they get instruction, but at a reduced level. Others are
sent to special schools for the handicapped. In addition, Aboriginal children
who come into the school system at older ages (nine or ten) without any prior
education are put in special education classes. Since these children will not be
up to their age level in math or reading, there is no place to put them other
36
than in a special education class. '
If the regular school is one which schedules "softer" courses such as arts
and crafts or music in the afternoon, some of the special students may join
classes of regular students. However, children who cannot "adjust to the regular classroom" or who "aren't accepted" in the regular classroom remain
separate even for the "softer" courses. In this district, when children are
"integrated" into the "softer" classes, the regular teacher is given no special
assistance or guidance. There are no teacher aides, supplementary services,
or other resources. 36 2 Indeed, outside the capital city, at least, special education classes are often assigned to novice or inexperienced teachers. There is
no significant special training or degree in special education in Western
3 63
Australia.
It is really the school principals who decide whether there will be special
education classes in their schools and how they are to be operated. If they do
not want the handicapped to mingle with other children, no mingling will
occur. Under the handicapped law in Western Australia, however, a principal
cannot place a child in a special education class without an assessment by the
educational psychologist or by the guidance counselor, and an assessment
cannot be undertaken without the written permission of the parent. It is also
up to individual teachers to determine whether the children will interact on
the playground. Only if the school is organized conveniently, with academic
subjects in the morning and arts and crafts or music in the afternoon, can
3 64
there be integration in nonacademic subjects as well.

In New South Wales, there is no state legislation for the handicapped,
although such legislation was being proposed in 1983. Under the then
existing system parents could reject the placement of their child in a separate
institution and demand that the child be integrated, but it was still up to
school principals to decide whether a school would admit the child or not. A
parent could appeal the principal's decision to the Director-General of the
State Education Department. Under the proposed legislation, an
3 65
independent panel would be established for the appeal.
361.
includes
362.
363.
364.
365.

Interviews with school officials in the Goldfield Region District, Western Australia (which
Kalgoorlie and several smaller towns) (July 15, 1983) (memoranda on file with author).
Id.
Id.; see also interview with Dr. Robert Weiland, supra note 356.
Interviews with school officials in the Goldfield Region District, supra note 361.
Interview with Dr. Douglas Swan, supra note 329.
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Programs for the Economically Disadvantaged

The Australian Disadvantaged Schools Program is somewhat comparable
in purpose to Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act in the
United States, although the statutes operate very differently. 36 6 Conditions
for receipt of Title I funding are extensive, occupying many pages of the
statute. For example, in order to receive funds, a local educational agency
(LEA) must use the funds "in school attendance areas having high concentrations of children from low-income families," and if the funds are insufficient
to provide programs for all educationally deprived children in the eligible
areas, the LEA must rank its school attendance areas from highest to lowest,
in accordance with the degree of concentration of children from low-income
families. 3 67 Funds are available only if an LEA makes "an assessment of educational need each year." 3 68 This assessment must "identify [the] educationally deprived children in the eligible attendance areas and . . .select those
educationally deprived children who have the greatest need for special assistance"; identify the instructional areas for the program; and determine the
"special educational needs" of the children who will participate in the program.3 6 9 The funds received by an LEA may only be used for programs
"which are of sufficient size, scope, and quality to give reasonable promise of
substantial progress toward meeting the special educational needs of the chil3 70
dren being served.
LEA's may receive funds only if they adopt effective procedures for evaluating the effectiveness of the programs "in meeting the special educational
needs of the educationally deprived children." 3 7 1 LEA's may not receive
funds unless teachers, school boards, and parents of children participating in
the programs are involved in the planning of the programs. 3 72 There must be
an advisory council for the entire school district and the composition of that
advisory council is specified in the statute. It must include members elected
by the school advisory councils, representatives of children and schools eligible for Title I programs but not participating in those programs (these rep366. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965), later amended by Act of Nov. 1,1978, Pub. L. No. 95561, 92 Stat. 2143, 2152-201. This Act was repealed in 1981 and has now become chapter I of the
Education Consolidation and Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-35, tit. V, subtit. D, 95 Stat. 463

(1981) (codified in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.), which is comparable in scope and character.
Title I's preamble sets forth its purpose:
In recognition of the special educational needs of children of low-income families and the impact
that concentrations of low-income families have on the ability of local educational agencies to
support adequate educational programs, the Congress hereby declares it to be the policy of the
United States to provide financial assistance. . . to local educational agencies serving areas with
concentrations of children from low-income families to expand and improve their educational
programs by various means (including pre-school programs) which contribute particularly to
meeting the special educational needs of educationally deprived children.
20 U.S.C. § 2701 (1982); see also id. § 3801.
367. Id. § 2732(a)(1).
368. Id.§ 2734(b).
369. Id.
370. Id. § 2734(d). Ordinarily, no project may be less than $2,500. id.
371. Id. § 2 7 3 4 (g)(1).
372. Id. § 2734(i)-(j).
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resentatives must be elected by the parents in such areas), and a majority of its
members must be parents of children to be served by Title I projects.3 73 In
addition, each project area or school must also have an advisory council, and a
majority of its members also must be parents of children to be served by the
3 74
programs. Members must be elected by the parents in the project area.
School districts are required to provide a program for training the members
375
of advisory councils.
With regard to fiscal requirements, LEA's are required to maintain their
level of spending from state and local funds in order to receive federal funds
under Title I ("maintenance of effort"); 3 76 funds may only be used to cover
those program costs which exceed the average per pupil expenditure for
37 7
pupils in the LEA ("excess costs");
and funds may be used only "to supplement and, to the extent practical, increase the level of funds that would, in the
absence of such Federal funds, be made available from regular non-Federal
sources . ... and in no case may such funds be so used as to supplant such
funds from such non-Federal sources."3 7 8 There are also "comparability
requirements": an LEA may receive funds "only if State and local funds will
be used . . . to provide services in project areas which, taken as a whole, are
at least comparable to services being provided in areas in such district which
are not receiving [Title I] funds." 379 Detailed recordkeeping is required by
380
each school district and extensive reports are required to be filed annually.
In contrast, the requirements for Australia's Disadvantaged Schools Program are quite minimal. In the States Grants (Schools Assistance) Act 1982, a
disadvantaged school is defined as a school "that should, in the opinion of the
State Education Minister, be treated as a disadvantaged school." 3 8 ' In the
States Grants (Schools) Act 1973, a disadvantaged school was defined more
precisely as a school
(a) the students at which, or a substantial portion of the students at which, are members of a community which, for social, economic, ethnic, geographic, cultural, lingual
or any similar reason, has a lower than average ability to take advantage of educational
facilities; and (b) which requires special facilities (whether in the form of buildings,
equipment, teaching staff or in some other form) for the purpose of enabling3 the
82
school to provide adequate educational opportunities for students at the school.

Disadvantaged schools can be government or nongovernment schools.
The only statutory conditions for receipt of the funds are the usual fiscal
reporting requirements. 38 3 In the Schools Commission's Guidelines, "school
communities," as a condition of funding, "are required to review their objec373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.

§ 2735.
Id. § 2735(a).
Id. § 2735(d).
Id. § 2736(a).
Id. § 2736(b).
Id. § 2736(c).
Id. § 2736(e).
Id. § 2737(a)-(b).
States Grants (Schools Assistance) Act 1982, § 3(1), 1982 Austl. Acts 1745, 1751.
States Grants (Schools) Act 1973, § 3(1), 1973 Austl. Acts 1407, 1411-12.
See supra text accompanying note 98.
Id.
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tives and operations, to draw up proposals designed to improve learning outcomes, to relate the curriculum more closely to the life experiences of the
children enrolled, and to bring about a closer association between parents
and the school."3 8 4 Almost anything can be supported under the rubric of a
"Disadvantaged Schools Program": curriculum innovation, basic skills programs, or programs for promoting interaction with the community.3 8 5 Most
programs, however, are concerned with promoting the involvement of the
community in the school. Funds are supposed to be allocated in response to
proposals formulated at the school level. Although the Commission Guidelines state that parents and teachers should participate in the formulation of
these proposals,38 6 such participation is not required; even if it were, there is
no mechanism for enforcing such a requirement. State education ministers
are responsible for determining which schools are to be declared disadvantaged schools.
Although the federal grants are supposed to supplement or "top up" what
the states are providing through their general funds, there is concern that
there may be a good deal of substitution rather than supplementation,
because there are no requirements such as the "maintainance of effort" and
"supplement, not supplant" provisions of Title 1.387 Indeed, although the
Disadvantaged Schools Program has been in existence for 10 years, there is
no comprehensive and systematic way of determining what the impact of the
program has been. The Schools Commission itself has undertaken no evaluations and there has been no other objective evaluation.
In many states the Disadvantaged Schools Program operates through a
joint committee for disadvantaged schools which has representatives from the
Catholic Education Commission, the independent schools, and the State
Department of Education.3 8 8 These committees are supposed to follow the
Guidelines, but there is currently no mechanism for the Commonwealth to
determine whether they are being followed. The Disadvantaged Schools Program differs from Title I in that it provides aid for disadvantaged schools rather
than disadvantaged children; there are, accordingly, some schools that have
severely disadvantaged children, but not enough to meet the criteria for
receiving funds. Other schools may have a sizeable minority of non-disadvantaged children, yet program aid is used to benefit the entire school. A second
problem, from the perspective of some state administrators, is that in many
cases funds are not spent usefully, often going for equipment. 38 9
In New South Wales, there are now 418 disadvantaged schools, most of
which have been "on the list" for at least 3 years, and many for much longer,
even though the character of the student population may have changed in the
384.
385.
386.
387.

GUIDELINES, supra note

316, at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 18.
20 U.S.C. § 2736(a)-(c), (e) (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 376-79.
388. Interview with Dr. Robert Vickery, Director-General, Department of Education, Western
Australia, and other State Department officials (July 12, 1983) (memorandum on file with author).
389. Id.
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meantime. The Disadvantaged Schools Program does not provide much
money. There are only about 130,000 children attending the disadvantaged
about $70 per capita from the
schools in New South Wales, which receives
390
Commonwealth to support the program.
State Education Department officials in New South Wales consider that the
impact of the Disalvantaged Schools Program has been on the general system.
For example, the community is supposed to be involved in developing
funding proposals. Therefore, many schools, whether disadvantaged or not,
have now established in-school planning committees. Although some schools
there have misused funds for equipment,3 9 1 most of the money received probably goes for instruction. One concern, however, is that the high level of community involvement might protect the program even if it is not as effective as
other possible programs would be.
D.

Summary of Australia's Grant Programs for Special Pupil Populations

As the foregoing analysis has indicated, the Commonwealth has not conditioned any of its specific purpose grants on the establishment of significant
substantive or programmatic requirements or procedural safeguards for the
target pupil populations. Thus Australia's current approach has been very
different from that taken by the federal government in the United States.
One problem with the federal role in education as it has developed in the
United States is the increasing number of federal requirements that have been
enacted in the last 20 years, beginning with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,392 followed by Title I, and further complicated by various statutes and
regulations prohibiting discrimination based on gender, handicap, and
national origin. In addition, federal aid for the handicapped, and for students
with limited English proficiency, has been extensively conditioned on both
procedural and substantive requirements.
It has been difficult for states, school districts, and schools to adjust to this
proliferation of programs and requirements. Each new federal program or
mandate has been established and administered separately from previous programs and requirements. School districts and states, therefore, tend to create
separate administrative structures for the various programs. It is at the school
level, however, that the combined effects of these requirements are felt. The
reporting requirements are extensive and require a good deal of paperwork
for both teachers and administrators. In the case of teachers, one of the principal concerns is that the considerable administrative burdens may take time
away from actual classroom instruction. The fiscal reporting requirements
have also encouraged the use of "pull out" programs ("withdrawal" programs
in Australia), removing children from regular classrooms for special
treatment.
390. Interview with Dr. Douglas Swan, supra note 329.
391. One example given was of a school which used program funds to purchase six tables for
table tennis. Id.
392. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4 (1982).
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With so many proliferating categorical programs, schools have often taken
an uncoordinated approach to the child who falls into more than one category. The educational problems of such children are compartmentalized in
response to federal accounting requirements rather than being classified
according to the children's educational needs. Thus the tendency has been to
organize the delivery of educational services to special pupiil populations in
accordance with federal funding categories rather than along functional lines.
Another problem is that many requirements, unfunded mandates as well
as conditions to grants-in-aid, must be financed from state and local revenues
at a time when school districts have come under increasingly severe financial
restraints. Moreover, the enforcement of civil rights requirements has been
complicated by the fact that the principal remedy for noncompliance is the
termination of federal funds, a draconian measure that the federal government is reluctant to use because it punishes the very children that the laws are
designed to help.
The system in Australia avoids many of these problems either by taking a
school-based approach for programs such as the Disadvantaged Schools Program, or by not imposing burdensome requirements that create undue
amounts of paperwork or limit the ability to adapt to the needs of a particular
community. There are, however, other problems with the Australian system
which have been pointed out previously.
There are significant differences between Title I programs and the Disadvantaged Schools Program as they are actually implemented. Largely as a
result of detailed federal regulation, Title I programs generally take the form
of supplementary instruction in the basic skills. The Disadvantaged Schools
Program in Australia is much broader and thus permits a greater variety of
programs not necessarily addressed to cognitive skills alone. Also, since the
program is school-based, rather than confined to specific targeted students,
the "pull out" problem is avoided. The difference in the size of the programs
14,000 school districts (and multiple schools within many of those districts)
receiving Title I funds, in contrast to about 1,000 schools in the Disadvantaged
Schools Program - may explain, in part, the need for extensive regulation in
Title I programs.
Owing to disparities in per pupil expenditures among school districts,
Title I funds are not always a means of getting more than average resources to
disadvantaged pupils. In many cases, particularly in rural and impoverished
urban districts, Title I funds help bring resources up toward the average in
low-spending districts. 3 93 By contrast, the Disadvantaged Schools Program
does provide greater than average resources to the schools selected. The
funds are so minimal for this program, however,-amounting to only about
$50 per pupil nationally-that they hardly constitute a significant increase
over regular per pupil expenditures. Using these funds to supplement the
393. On the other hand, the Title I program has done much to eliminate intradistrict disparities
in state and local funding. Thus as between Title I and non-Title I schools within a school district,
the funds can be a significant increment.
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teaching of basic skills would accomplish little. A program which fosters
school-based experimentation and community involvement with the school
may be better suited to the limited nature of the funding and the limited
number of schools participating. Thus the U.S. program seeks to attack
directly low achievement in specific pupils; the Australian program seeks to
improve schooling in schools where there has been the least pupil success.
The Australian program neither identifies the problem nor specifies an
approach to addressing it. There is no way to measure the effectiveness of
programs that are developed in individual schools, or to disseminate knowledge about what works and what does not. Thus it is unclear whether the
Disadvantaged Schools Program has had any significant impact on the target
children, and whether the funds are being effectively used to address academic and related needs.
Programs for language minority children in Australia have primarily been
directed toward new arrivals (children whose language is other than English
and who have not yet entered an Australian school), with intensive instruction
to prepare them to enter a regular school. The Commonwealth cannot
ensure that a state does much more than that. ESL training for teachers is
rudimentary, and "withdrawal" programs are for minimal periods during the
school week. Nothing is done for second or third generation children with
limited English proficiency, although such children exist in Australia as well as
in the United States. Affirmative language assistance programs are much
better developed in the United States and apply to a wider group of children
than in Australia.
In the area of aid to the handicapped, the situation in Australia appears to
be similar to that in the United States prior to the first major lawsuit establishing the rights of the handicapped, Pennsylvania Associationfor Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania.3 94 In Australia, neither parents nor the children
themselves enjoy significant procedural or substantive guarantees of an equal
educational opportunity for handicapped children. Individual school principals retain a good deal of autonomy in this area. In the United States, the
EAHCA, without dictating educational content, establishes the right to a free
appropriate public education guaranteed through procedural safeguards, permitting parents to participate in developing the child's individualized education plan and in determining appropriate placement for the child. In
Australia, by contrast, no state except Western Australia 3 9 5 has passed legisla-

tion providing for parental involvement in decisions regarding the education
and placement of a handicapped child. No such requirements are attached to
the receipt of Commonwealth funds, and parents do not enjoy a right of
appeal.
394. 343 F. Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (consent decree); see also Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F.
Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
395. Western Australian legislation gives parents a right to participate in a planning conference
and a right of appeal from decisions of the Minister, Education Act 1928-1981, 19 Geo. 5, no. xxxiii,
§ 20E, 5 W. AUSTL. REPR. AcTs 1, 33 (1982), but this has not had a significant impact on parental
involvement in placement decisions. See supra text accompanying note 356.
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VI
CONCLUSION

The High Court decisions in Koowarta v. Bjelke-Petersen39 6 and the Tasmanian Dam Case39 7 indicate that the Australian Parliament, using its external
affairs power, could enact federal legislation guaranteeing equal educational
opportunity for various special pupil populations. Existing international covenants and agreements on human rights provide a sufficient nexus for such
domestic legislation. In addition, the Parliament has broad power under section 96 of the Australian constitution to condition its specific purpose grants
for education so as to protect the interests of children with special needs,
much in the same way as the U.S. Congress has done in Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 39 8 the EAHCA, 39 9 and the Bilingual Edu400

cation Act.
Although the Parliament would seem to have the constitutional authority
to enact civil rights mandates in the area of education and to condition its aid
to education programs on similar requirements, the question is whether Australia's traditions and political/legal culture will permit this authority to be
exercised. Australia's educational system is basically paternalistic: the power
of educational decisionmaking is entrusted to the professional. The political/legal culture of the United States, fostered by the Bill of Rights and its
tradition of protecting the individual, makes parents more ready to assert
their rights against the professional and courts more ready to enforce those
rights than is evident in Australia.
In light of the strong Australian preference for "states' rights" rather than
a strong national government, combined with a tradition of deferring to professionals, 40 ' it would not be suprising if there is, in the future, little change in
396. 39 Austl. L.R. 417 (1982); see supra notes 125-60 and accompanying text.
397. Commonwealth v. Tasmania, 46 Austl. L.R. 625 (1983); see supra notes 161-213 and accompanying text.
398. Pub. L. No. 89-10, tit. I, 79 Stat. 27, 27-36 (1965) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); see supra note 366.
399. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1461 (1982); see supra text accompanying notes 337-42.
400. Id. §§ 3221-3261; see supra text accompanying notes 306-15.
401. Despite the much less intrusive nature of the federal programs in Australia, the tensions
between the state departments of education and the Commonwealth are reminiscent of those in the
United States. Consider the following:
The role of the Director-General of Education as an instrument of State Government policy is
complicated by the increasing prevalence of education policy dictates from the Commonwealth
Government. The increasing use of specific purpose grants under Section 96 of the Commonwealth Constitution, has enabled the Commonwealth Government to impose its own educational
priorities by making grants available for special purposes such as Aboriginal education, multicultural education, community involvement in schools, choice and diversity in schools, professional development, school-based curriculum development, transition education, and English as
a second language. These priorities may or may not conform with the priorities of State Governments which consider themselves more able than a national government to accurately assess the
needs of students. . ..
The Commonwealth's priorities . . . have been pursued by . . . the Schools Commission
...
. Inevitably with the extension of the national educational bureaucracy, questions of power
and personality impinged on the deeper philosophical and educational issues . . . . [T]he
determination of specific priorities is the prerogative of State Governments . . ..
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the status quo. 40 2 It seems likely that some civil rights protections related to
education will be introduced by the Labor Government, but they are unlikely
to contain the kinds of sanctions, or to be implemented with the kind of
detailed regulations, found in the United States. It also seems unlikely that
the Government will use its section 96 power to attach extensive conditions
on its federal aid to education.
In sum, there is constitutional authority for significant changes in the current system, but the political/legal culture of Australia will inhibit such
changes, at least in the near future. The seeds have been planted, however,
and perhaps a model may yet develop that includes some of the "rights" focus
of the U.S. legislation, while retaining some of the flexibility and cooperative
nature of the current Australian approach.

Vickery, The Practising Administrator: Dilemmas and Strategies of a State Department of Education,
(July 1983) (unpublished paper).
402. But see Buss, Special Education in Englandand Wales, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1985, at
119 (indicating that Great Britain has begun to alter the status quo with regard to the rights of
handicapped children to an equal educational opportunity).

